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I. INTRODUCTION
The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment has an immensely
appealing simplicity: "[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offence
to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb .... ." While on its face the clause
seems unambiguous, its scope has become the subject of an intensifying
debate. The Supreme Court has held that double jeopardy protects defen-
dants from both successive criminal prosecutions and from unauthorized
multiple punishments for the same act.2 In 1989 and 1990, the Supreme
Court issued two decisions, Grady v. Corbin3 and United States v. Halper,a that
appeared to extend significantly the reach of those two protections under the
Double Jeopardy Clause. Enunciating a broader test for determining when a
separately charged crime is actually part of the "same offence," the 5-4 Grady
court held that the government cannot establish an essential element of the
newly charged offense by proving the same conduct used in a prior criminal
proceeding.5 Along the same lines, the Halper court held that sanctions
imposed in a civil proceeding could constitute an impermissible criminal
punishment in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause's protection from
multiple punishments.6
Only three years after announcing the new rule in Grady, however, the
Court overruled that decision in United States v. Dixon,7 another 5-4 decision
that fragmented the Justices.8 On the same day it announced Dixon, the
Court relied on Halper to extend the protections of the Eighth Amendment's
Excessive Fines Clause to civil forfeiture proceedings, holding that the
proceedings constitute punishment of the property owner.9 The Court thus
raised the question of whether the Double Jeopardy Clause will prohibit
successive criminal prosecutions and civil forfeitures. The Court did not,
however, acknowledge that its reliance on Halper could raise troubling
double jeopardy issues that might affect future criminal actions in which
property was forfeited before the institution of criminal charges.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
2. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969), overruled by Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 802
(1989).
3. 495 U.S. 508 (1990).
4. 490 U.S. 435 (1989).
5. 495 U.S. at 523.
6. 490 U.S. at 448-449.
7. 113 S. Ct. 2849 (1993).
8. Id. at 2860. The Court stated that "Grady lacks constitutional roots." Id.
9. Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801, 2810 (1993) (forfeitures constitute punishment under
Eighth Amendment).
[Vol. 31:1
DOUBLE JEOPARDY
By repeatedly tinkering with the scope of the Double Jeopardy Clause, the
Supreme Court has generated greater confusion than clarity in determining
when the government can subject a defendant to multiple legal actions
arising out of the same general conduct or series of transactions. The Court's
failure to agree on a cogent analysis of double jeopardy means that its
decisions provide only minimal guidance to lower courts, which must rely on
conjecture about what the Court meant by its often cryptic pronouncements.
Before it reversed Grady, the Supreme Court itself acknowledged that its
analysis was difficult to understand.1 °
One reason for this inconsistency is that the expansion of the double
jeopardy protections announced in Grady and Halper appear to be based
more on a visceral reaction to apparent misuse of prosecutorial power than a
principled analysis of the limits of a defendant's constitutional rights.11 Grady
involved a complete breakdown in communication between different prosecu-
tors within a local district attorney's office when one prosecutor permitted
the defendant to plead guilty to minor traffic offenses without knowing that
the traffic accident caused two deaths for which the defendant was subse-
quently indicted. 12 In Halper, the government sought a $130,000 civil penalty
for filing false Medicare claims, valued at $585, for which the defendant had
previously pleaded guilty and received a two-year prison sentence and a
$5,000 fine. 13 The factual scenarios in Grady and Halper prompted the Court
to question the fairness of the government's prosecution in the later proceed-
ing; these concerns in turn resulted in decisions that expanded the double
jeopardy protection without considering the impact of the new principles.
The Court created unnecessary complexity by moving the Double Jeopardy
Clause away from its roots as a narrow but categorical constitutional protec-
tion.
Dixon rejected the broad approach of Grady by emphasizing that there is a
single test for applying the Double Jeopardy Clause: a comparison of the
elements of the different statutes under which a defendant has been charged
to determine if they constitute the "same offence." One of the Court's
10. See United States v. Felix, 112 S. Ct. 1377, 1384 (1992) (reads language of Grady more narrowly
because of "difficulties which have already arisen in its interpretation"), reh'g denied, 113 S. Ct. 13
(1992).
11. See Anne Bowen Poulin, Double Jeopardy: Grady and Dowling Stir the Muddy Waters, 43
RUTGERS L. REV. 889, 892 (1991) (Grady is a significant step in double jeopardy analysis); Linda S.
Eads, Separating Crime from Punishment: The Constitutional Implications of Halper v. United States, 68
WASH. U. L.Q. 929 (1990) (Halper a remarkable change in the law); Andrew Z. Glickman, Note, Civil
Sanctions and the Double Jeopardy Clause: Applying the Multiple Punishment Doctrine to Parallel
Proceedings After Halper v. United States, 76 VA. L. REV. 1251 (1990) (Halper redefined and enlarged
double jeopardy clause in departing from fifty years of precedent).
12. 495 U.S. at 511-14.
13. 490 U.S. at 439.
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rationales for overruling Grady was that the same conduct test had produced
substantial "confusion."' t4 Much like the Double Jeopardy Clause itself,
however, the Dixon Court's "same elements" test, first enunciated in Block-
burger v. United States' 5 in 1932, is easier to state than to apply. Indeed, the
majority in Dixon splintered as to how strictly to apply Blockburger.16 As a
result, the decision does not provide much meaningful guidance on how to
judge whether a successive prosecution involves the same elements as the
prior action.
Clarifying the scope of the Double Jeopardy Clause becomes more impor-
tant as governments, both federal and state, increasingly use civil remedies in
tandem with criminal actions. Parallel civil and criminal actions are becoming
more the rule than the exception in prosecutions for economic crimes.
Narcotics prosecutions frequently involve asset forfeiture actions,' 7 and
white collar fraud cases often trigger civil remedies that may result in money
penalties 8 and debarment from an industry or from continuing involvement
in government programs' 9 in addition to asset forfeiture.20 Moreover, the
increased focus on combating criminal enterprises and repeat offenders has
led to greater use of complex criminal statutes, such as the Racketeering
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 2' the Continuing Crimi-
14. Dixon, 113 S. Ct. at 2864.
15. 284 U.S. 299 (1932).
16. Compare 113 S. Ct. at 2853 (Scalia, J., announcing judgment) (subsequent prosection for
certain offenses violates same elements test); id. at 2868 (White J., concurring and dissenting) ("I also
am uncomfortable with the reasoning underlying ... the application of Blockburger v. United
States .... ); id. at 2881 (Souter, J. concurring and dissenting) (concurring in reversal of certain
counts under Grady analysis) and id. at 2879 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(same) with id. at 2865 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring and dissenting) (opposing reversal of certain
counts because "I believe that they are separate offenses under Blockburger").
17. See 21 U.S.C. § 853 (1988) (criminal asset forfeiture); 21 U.S.C. § 881 (1988) (civil asset
forfeiture).
18. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 77(l) and 77(x) (1988) (money penalties for violations of securities laws);
29 U.S.C. § 666(a) (1988) (civil money penalties for violation of Occupational Safety and Health Act);
31 U.S.C. § 3730 (1988) (civil money penalties for filing false claims with federal government); 33
U.S.C. § 1321(b)(6)(B) (1988) (civil money penalties for discharging oil in navigable waters).
19. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 77t(b), 78u(d) (1988) (injunctions authorized barring person from serving
as officer or director of public company for violations of securities laws); 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7(b)(1)
(1988) (exclusion from Medicare and Medicaid programs upon criminal conviction related to delivery
of health care item or service).
20. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 11 (1988) (forfeiture of property acquired in antitrust violations); 18
U.S.C. §§ 981-82 (1988) (civil and criminal asset forfeiture provisions); 19 U.S.C. § 1453 (1988)
(forfeiture of property smuggled in violation of customs laws). There are over 100 federal forfeiture
provisions. Mary M. Cheh, Constitutional Limits on Using Civil Remedies to Achieve Criminal Law
Objectives: Understanding and Transcending the Criminal-Civil Law Distinction, 42 HASTINGs L.J. 1325,
1326 n.4 (1991).
21. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (1988). RICO requires proof that, among other things, the defendant
engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity involving violations of a long list of criminal statutes.
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nal Enterprise (CCE)2" provision of the drug law, and Money Laundering,2 3
that may include previously prosecuted offenses as predicates in subsequent
prosecutions. These trends implicate the successive prosecution and multiple
punishment prongs of the Double Jeopardy Clause, and the government
must decide how a prior prosecution or civil action by one office will affect a
later case by another office or agency before it commits its scarce prosecuto-
rial resources.
This Article examines the application of the Double Jeopardy Clause in
the expanding area of successive governmental actions. Halper has obscured
the distinction between multiple penalty cases and successive prosecutions
because the question of whether a civil sanction constitutes a criminal
penalty can arise whenever the government brings a succeeding action, either
criminal or civil. While Dixon and Halper address seemingly distinct aspects
of double jeopardy, the issues are beginning to merge. Prosecutors and
defense attorneys faced with successive actions must determine at the outset
whether there is a valid double jeopardy claim, because it may bar the
subsequent action from going forward, thereby sparing the defendant from a
second action and the government the expense of undertaking an unneces-
sary case. The status of the case in the investigative and prosecutorial
process, therefore, provides a structure to analyze how double jeopardy
issues affect criminal and civil actions, and how the government can avoid
wasting its resources in pursuing actions that may run afoul of the Double
Jeopardy Clause.
Part II of the Article briefly examines the scope of the Double Jeopardy
Clause and the basic values the provision seeks to vindicate. Part III
examines the development of Grady's same conduct test, and how the
weakness of that approach led the Court to overrule that precedent in Dixon.
The Article then examines uncertainty in Dixon's application of the Block-
burger test, and discusses how double jeopardy will continue to challenge the
courts in criminal prosecutions that seek to incorporate into a subsequent
case conduct for which a defendant has already been prosecuted. The Article
will focus on two areas: whether multiple charges arising from a course of
conduct may still constitute a double jeopardy violation, despite the overrul-
ing of Grady; and, whether it is constitutional to bring new prosecutions
based on conduct that was already used to enhance a sentence under the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines.
22. 21 U.S.C. § 848 (1988). A continuing criminal enterprise involves drug violations undertaken by
a group of five or more persons over whom the defendant occupies a supervisory or managerial
position, and who derive substantial income or resources from the enterprise.
23. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956-57 (1988). Proof of money laundering requires, among other things, that the
defendant engaged in "specified unlawful activity" that involves the receipt or transfer of funds
arising from violations of a long list of criminal statutes.
1993]
AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW
Part IV focuses on the flaws in the Supreme Court's analysis in Halper that
forced it to treat a successive prosecution case as a multiple punishment case
because any other approach would have brought a revolutionary expansion in
criminal constitutional rights to the civil arena. Halper requires a court to
analyze the civil sanction only in relation to the underlying harm, and not in
comparison with the criminal sanction imposed in another prosecution. The
issue, therefore, is ascertaining whether the severity of the sanction rises to
the level of a criminal punishment, which requires courts to engage in a
proportionality analysis that is foreign to the underlying values of the Double
Jeopardy Clause. The Court's concern in Halper, as in Grady, was to correct
perceived prosecutorial misconduct which, inadvertently or otherwise, sought
an unfair penalty through a second action. Policing the government's power
to seek potentially unjust punishment in successive actions is not, however,
best achieved through the Double Jeopardy Clause. It is the Eighth Amend-
ment that prohibits both cruel and unusual punishments and excessive
fines,24 and the Supreme Court has held this amendment to mean that
criminal punishments must be proportional to the underlying conduct.2 5 The
Excessive Fines Clause is especially appropriate for analyzing civil monetary
sanctions because, unlike Halper, that approach does not raise the question
of whether other constitutional criminal protections should be applied to civil
actions.
The Article then reviews the Court's recent decisions in Austin v. United
States26 and Alexander v. United States, 27 which establish that the Excessive
Fines Clause applies to both civil and criminal asset forfeitures. Austin relies
on Halper to establish that a civil forfeiture constitutes punishment under the
Eighth Amendment, 8 which raises the question of whether forfeitures
constitute sufficient punishment to invoke the protections of the Double
Jeopardy Clause in a second proceeding. If the true injustice in Halper is that
the second civil penalty was too severe, then the Eighth Amendment is the
proper vehicle for correcting the constitutional violation. The Eighth Amend-
ment is much better suited to a case-by-case analysis than the Double
Jeopardy Clause because both prosecutors and defendants need straightfor-
ward rules in determining the degree of criminal and civil exposure arising
from a course of conduct. Halper undermines the need for clarity in double
24. The Eighth Amendment states: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CoNsT. amend. ViII.
25. See Harmelin v. Michigan, 111 S. Ct. 2680 (1991) (Eighth Amendment provides for narrow
proportionality analysis in non-capital sentences); Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983) (proportional-
ity analysis applies to felony prison sentences).
26. 113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993).
27. 113 S. Ct. 2766 (1993).
28. 113 S. Ct. at 2812 (citing Halper to support proposition that forfeitures serve both remedial and
punitive purposes).
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jeopardy analysis by creating a fact-intensive test in a case that simply does
not fit the functional structure of the Double Jeopardy Clause.
II. THE SARGASSO SEA OF DOUBLE JEOPARDY
The roots of the prohibition on double jeopardy extend back as far as
Ancient Greece, and they were firmly established in English common law
long before the American Revolution.29 Sir William Blackstone noted the
"universal maxim of the common law of England that no man is to be brought
into jeopardy of his life more than once for the same offence.",30 The Fifth
Amendment's prohibition against double jeopardy resulted from a change in
the wording of the clause. James Madison's original proposal stated that "no
person shall be subject, except in cases of impeachment, to more than one
punishment or trial for the same offence." 31 In order to avoid confusion over
whether a defendant could seek to set aside an erroneous conviction and be
tried a second time, the phraseology was changed to "twice put in jeopardy"
for the same offense.32 There was no clear understanding of what "same
offence" meant under either the common law or in Congress at the time
Madison proposed the Fifth Amendment, and the Supreme Court has since
struggled to find an acceptable principle.33
The Double Jeopardy Clause embodies three values that help explain the
scope of its protection, depending on the context in which the issue arises.
Where the defendant has been tried before, the primary value is protecting
the defendant's interest in the finality of the verdict.34 A second value,
29. See Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 699 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting 1
DEMOSTHENES 589 (J. Vincent trans., 4th ed. 1970)); J. SIGLER, DOUBLE JEOPARDY: THE DEVELOP-
MENT OF A LEGAL AND SOCIAL POLICY 2 (1969) (tracing protection to Greek and Roman law); see
generally George C. Thomas, III, An Elegant Theory of Double Jeopardy, 1988 U. ILL. L. REV. 827,
827-28 (1988) (reviewing early history of double jeopardy) [hereinafter Thomas, Elegant Theory];
Donald Eric Burton, Note, A Closer Look at the Supreme Court and the Double Jeopardy Clause, 49
OHIO ST. L.J. 799, 800-03 (1988) (same).
30. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 335 (1809). Under the common law, there were four
pleas a defendant could enter to bar a subsequent prosecution: autrefois acquit, autrefois convict,
autrefois attaint, and former pardon. United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 341-42 (1975).
31. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 434 (J. Gales ed. 1789); SIGLER, supra note 29, at 28-31.
32. SIGLER, supra note 29, at 31-32; see also George C. Thomas, III, The Prohibition of Successive
Prosecutions for the Same Offense: In Search of a Definition, 71 IOWA L. REV. 323, 329-30 (1986)
(reviewing history of Double Jeopardy Clause) [hereinafter Thomas, Successive Prosecutions].
33. See Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. at 700 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (scope of double
jeopardy protection "turns upon the meaning of the words 'same offence,' a phrase deceptively simple
in appearance but virtually kaleidoscopic in application"); Thomas, Successive Prosecutions, supra
note 32, at 330 (large body of case law developed to resolve uncertainty).
34. Jeffers v. United States, 432 U.S. 137, 150 (1977) (plurality opinion). In an earlier case, the
Court stated that "the State with all its resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated
attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment,
expense and ordeal ... as well as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent he may be found
guilty." Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957). Professor Thomas argues that verdict
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applicable in the multiple punishment situation, prevents the court from
imposing a punishment greater than that authorized by the legislature,
although the Double Jeopardy Clause does not directly limit the legislature's
discretion to define an act as criminal or to set the sanction to be applied
upon a finding of guilt." A third value implicated by the Double Jeopardy
Clause is to check prosecutorial overreaching while maintaining society's
interest in prosecuting those who violate the law.36 If the government has not
manipulated the process to give itself an opportunity to rehearse the case or
seek a conviction through repeated trials, then society's interest in punishing
criminals may outweigh a defendant's interest in preventing a second prosecu-
tion. The Supreme Court has struggled to apply these different values in
analyzing the scope of the "same offence" for double jeopardy.37
In North Carolina v. Pearce,38 the Supreme Court sketched its classic
definition of double jeopardy's threefold protections to vindicate the clause's
underlying values: "It protects against a second prosecution for the same
offense after acquittal. It protects against a second prosecution for the same
offense after conviction. And it protects against multiple punishments for the
same offense.",39 Although most cases cite this thumbnail description,40
Dixon and Grady demonstrate that the constitutional right is not subject to
any simplistic analysis. The first two protections described in Pearce are
concerned with successive criminal actions, while the third focuses on the
degree of punishment authorized for a single course of criminal conduct. In
considering the scope of double jeopardy's protection, the procedural pos-
ture of the case, whether it constitutes a successive prosecution or a multiple
punishment, provides a serviceable means of determining the scope of
finality is the only value that the Double Jeopardy Clause protects. Thomas, Elegant Theory, supra
note 29, at 839.
35. See Thomas, Elegant Theory, supra note 29, at 839 ("Because the legislature could constitution-
ally create, in a single conviction, the consequences of two convictions, no coherent rationale justifies
a double jeopardy limit on the number of convictions a legislature may authorize in a single trial.").
36. Justice O'Connor has argued that double jeopardy would not bar a second prosecution where
the government had not used unduly oppressive tactics in bringing the later case. Garrett v. United
States, 471 U.S. 773, 796 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring); see Thomas, Elegant Theory, supra note
29, at 871 (criticizing focus on government oppression as a value underlying double jeopardy). It has
also been suggested that double jeopardy protects the interest in jury nullification by not permitting
retrial of acquitted crimes. Peter Westen, The Three Faces of Double Jeopardy: Reflections on
GovernmentAppeals of Criminal Sentences, 78 MICH. L. REV. 1001, 1012 (1980).
37. Chief Justice Rehnquist noted with apparent exasperation that precedents in this area are "a
veritable Sargasso Sea which could not fail to challenge the most intrepid judicial navigator."
Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 343 (1981). That lament came approximately a decade before
Grady and Halper, and Dixon's fragmented analysis shows that the Supreme Court has done little to
relieve the confusion since then.
38. 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
39. Id. at 717 (footnotes omitted).
40. See, e.g., United States v. Dixon, 113 S. Ct. 2849, 2855 (1993); Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508,
516 (1990); United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 440 (1989).
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double jeopardy's protection. If the government seeks to try the defendant a
second time, then the question is whether the "same offence" will be tried in
the subsequent proceeding; if the question is multiple punishments, then the
defendant is subject to a sanction, and the issue is whether any additional
sanction can be imposed in the same case.
The bifurcation of the Double Jeopardy Clause makes it important for
both prosecutors and defense counsel to view double jeopardy as a functional
issue affecting their analysis of a defendant's exposure to additional sanc-
tions. Their initial concern is ascertaining what stage the government has
reached in pursuing a defendant. If the government has not taken any public
action and the matter is still in the pre-indictment phase, double jeopardy is
not an issue for the defendant. For the prosecutor, however, any charging
decisions will include double jeopardy considerations because each count
must pass muster as not imposing an impermissible multiple punishment.
Once the government files an action against a defendant and that matter
reaches a final conclusion, double jeopardy becomes an issue of paramount
importance because the government may bring additional actions that relate
in some way to the conduct in the first action. Even before an action reaches
its conclusion, the government faces coordination problems if it brings both
civil and criminal cases arising from the same underlying conduct.
A. Blockburger v. United States: The Same Elements Test
of Double Jeopardy
In Blockburger v. United States,41 the Court held that double jeopardy does
not affect prosecutions where at least one of the elements of an offense is
different from the elements of any other crimes charged.42 Blockburger
requires a straightforward comparison of the elements of each offense,
without reference to the actual proof that will be introduced at trial, to
determine whether there is any difference between the crimes. The question
that has perplexed the Court since Blockburger is whether that test is the sole
means of determining when a defendant has been prosecuted for the "same
offence."
In Brown v. Ohio,4 3 the Supreme Court applied the Blockburger test to
determine that a subsequent prosecution for a greater offense violated
double jeopardy after a conviction for a lesser-included offense because they
were the same statutory offenses.4 4 In Harris v. Oklahoma45 the Court issued
a terse per curiam decision holding that "the Double Jeopardy Clause bars
41. 284 U.S. 299 (1932).
42. Id. at 304.
43. 432 U.S. 161 (1977).
44. Id. at 166.
45. 433 U.S. 682 (1977).
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prosecution for the lesser crime after conviction of the greater one."46 These
opinions focus on the legislature's authority to define crimes as the primary
means to analyze the double jeopardy claims. Both Brown and Harris involved
simple criminal conduct, which allowed the Court to avoid any detailed
analysis of whether the legislature's intent in passing different statutes
defines the entire scope of the Double Jeopardy Clause. Nevertheless, Harris
came to stand for the proposition that Blockburger requires a court to go
beyond a rote comparison of the elements of the different statutes by
requiring consideration of whether the proof of one violation is incorporated
in the proof of the elements of the other offense.47
Two years after Harris, in Whalen v. United States, the Court stated that
where two statutes "proscribe the 'same offence,' they are construed not to
authorize cumulative punishments in the absence of a clear indication of
contrary legislative intent."4 8 Whalen apparently requires the legislature to
articulate its intent to create separate punishments to overcome a finding
that two statutes outlaw the same criminal conduct. After Whalen, Block-
burger appeared to be a constitutional rule prohibiting multiple punishments
or successive prosecutions under different statutes that define the same
crime unless the legislature declares its intent otherwise by requiring proof of
different elements under the statutes.
The next term, however, the Court rejected such a construction of the
Blockburger test in Albernaz v. United States.49 The Court held that Block-
burger is a test of statutory construction only, and it does not apply where
Congress clearly intended to impose separate punishments for criminal
activity.50 Under Albernaz's formulation of the Blockburger test, the only
constitutional limit implicated by the Double Jeopardy Clause on multiple
punishments is the legislature's intent. t
The Court took the reasoning in Albernaz one step further in Missouri v.
Hunter.52 In that case, the defendant had been convicted of robbery and
46. Id.
47. See Dixon, 113 S. Ct. at 2857 (Harris stands for proposition that crime cannot be abstracted from
the elements of the offense); Grady, 495 U.S. at 519-20 (Harris stands for proposition that "strict
application of Blockburger test is not the exclusive means of determining whether a subsequent
prosecution violates the Double Jeopardy Clause").
48. 495 U.S. at 692. The defendant was convicted of rape and felony-murder for killing the victim of
the rape, and received consecutive prison terms for the two convictions. The defendant argued that
the rape conviction merged with the felony-murder conviction, and therefore barred consecutive
sentences. Id. at 685-86.
49. 450 U.S. 333.
50. Id. at 340. The defendant was convicted of conspiracy to import marijuana and conspiracy to
distribute marijuana, and was sentenced to consecutive terms of imprisonment. He argued that there
was only one conspiracy, and therefore his dual convictions violated the multiple punishment prong of
the Double Jeopardy Clause. Id. at 336.
51. Id. at 344.
52. 459 U.S. 359 (1983).
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armed criminal action, which imposed an additional sentence for using a
deadly weapon in the commission of a crime.53 The Court held that, even
though the two state statutes defined the same crime, and therefore would
fail the Blockburger test, double jeopardy does not automatically preclude
imposition of multiple punishments. Where the legislature "specifically
authorizes cumulative punishment under two statutes, regardless of whether
those two statutes proscribe the 'same' conduct under Blockburger, a court's
task of statutory construction is at an end. ... ,,5 Thus, the Court concluded
that there is no limitation on the legislature's power under the Double
Jeopardy Clause to impose as great or as many punishments as it wishes. The
Court pulled away completely from any implication in Whalen that there
might be a constitutional constraint on the legislature.
B. Struggling to Define Same Offense in Successive Prosecutions
While the Court refined the Blockburger analysis, it also began to question
whether that approach adequately defined the constitutional protection in
successive prosecution cases in Illinois v. Vitale,55 a case with a factual
scenario startlingly similar to Grady. In Vitale, the defendant killed two small
children in an automobile accident and was convicted of a minor traffic
violation for failing to reduce speed; the next day, the state charged him with
involuntary manslaughter.56 The Court found that the traffic offense was not
necessarily a lesser-included offense of the manslaughter charge, and there-
fore Blockburger did not preclude the second prosecution.5
The more important aspect of Vitale was the Court's statement, in dicta,
that if the state had to rely on the conduct previously prosecuted to prove the
manslaughter charge, then the "claim of double jeopardy would be substan-
tial under Brown and our later decision in Harris v. Oklahoma .... "58 The
Court apparently expanded the scope of the Double Jeopardy Clause in
Vitale by asserting that the state cannot rely on such conduct for proof in the
later prosecution, but it did not explain the reason why this new analysis was
needed to supplement Blockburger. The reference to Brown and Harris shows
that the Court did not view the lesser-included offense analysis as limited
solely to crimes that necessarily entail a complete overlap between the
53. Id. at 362 (quoting Mo. REV. STAT. § 559.225 (Supp. 1976)).
54. Id. at 368-69.
55. 447 U.S. 410 (1980).
56. Id. at 411-13.
57. Id. at 419 ("The mere possibility that the state will seek to rely on all of the ingredients
necessarily included in the traffic offense to establish an element of its manslaughter case would not
be sufficient to bar the later prosecution.").
58. Id. at 420.
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elements of the offenses. Instead, Vitale gives a clue that the Court was not
entirely comfortable with permitting the statutory definition of an offense,
without reference to the actual conduct being prosecuted, to govern the
meaning of "same offence."
The Court's failure to reach a consensus on when a defendant had been
prosecuted in a second proceeding for the same offense led to a continuing
fragmentation in its decisions. Justice Brennan argued repeatedly that the
Court should adopt a same conduct test for determining the same offense
that would require the government, in most instances, to bring all charges
from a single transaction against a defendant in one proceeding.5 9 The Court,
however, refused to move in that direction. Instead, in Garrett v. United
States,60 it adopted yet another approach to the double jeopardy issue in
successive prosecution cases involving complex, ongoing criminal activity.
The defendant in Garrett pleaded guilty to a marijuana importation charge
in Washington state, and was then indicted two months later in Florida under
the CCE provision of the drug statute for marijuana importation. At trial on
the CCE count, which required the government to prove three or more
successive criminal narcotics violations, the government introduced evidence
of the marijuana importation charged in the Washington case.6' Applying the
Hunter analysis, the Court noted that while Blockburger would prohibit
successive prosecution of the underlying predicate offense and CCE, Con-
gress clearly intended that the CCE provision be separately punishable in
addition to any sanction imposed for the predicate offenses.62 Upon dispens-
ing with the congressional intent analysis, the Court turned to whether CCE
is the "same offence" as the predicate offense if they are charged in
successive prosecutions. The Court rejected any "ready transposition" of the
lesser-included offense analysis of Brown and Harris, which involved only a
single course of conduct, "to the multilayered conduct, both as to time and to
place, involved in this case."63 Even assuming the underlying predicate
offense is a lesser-included offense of the CCE, the Court held that was
59. See Harris v. Oklahoma, 433 U.S. 682, 683 (1977) (Brennan, J., concurring); Brown v. Ohio, 432
U.S. 161, 170 (1977) (Brennan, J., concurring); Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 453-54 (1970)
(Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Brennan also dissented regularly from the denial of certiorari in
successive prosecution cases, arguing for a rule requiring the government to bring a single prosecution
for all crimes arising from the same transaction. See Sara Barton, Note, Grady v. Corbin: An
Unsuccessful Effort to Define "Same Offense", 25 GA. L. REV. 143, 152 n.54 (1990) (citing dissents from
denial of certiorari filed by Justice Brennan).
60. 471 U.S. 773 (1985).
61. Id. at 776. Garrett was sentenced to five years in prison and a $15,000 fine on the Washington
state charge, and 40 years in prison and a $100,000 fine on the later CCE count, to be served
consecutively. Id. at 775, 777.
62. Id. at 779.
63. Id. at 789.
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irrelevant where the defendant's crimes continued beyond the period of the
offense in the earlier indictment.64
Garrett takes the double jeopardy analysis in a fundamentally different
direction from that hinted at in Vitale. With the Blockburger test limited to an
analysis of legislative intent, the "same offence" issue shifted in Garrett to
whether the Court would find that the Double Jeopardy Clause imposed a
second layer of protection, at least in the successive prosecution instance.
The Court indicated that there is no greater protection available because it
allows prosecutors to use explicitly a previously charged offense in a later
prosecution, going so far as to permit the government to employ the same
evidence in a second prosecution. While Garrett distinguishes multilayered
conduct from a single transaction or event, it does not explain why double
jeopardy permits in one set of circumstances what it prohibits in another. The
Double Jeopardy Clause does not, on its face, apply differently depending on
the complexity of the underlying offenses or applicable statutes. Neverthe-
less, Garrett makes the Blockburger test the controlling form of double
jeopardy analysis for multilayered activity. To the extent that any greater
protection may exist, the Court would impose restrictions only on subsequent
prosecutions arising out of simple events or transactions. Garrett did little,
however, to relieve the tension over how to define the "same offence" by
refusing to give anything more than a cryptic reference to the scope of the
Double Jeopardy Clause.65
C. Reuse of Acquitted Conduct in a Second Prosecution: Collateral Estoppel as
a Component of Double Jeopardy
In addition to the struggle over successive prosecutions based on the same
underlying conduct, the Court considered the collateral estoppel effect of a
prior acquittal on a second prosecution in which the government sought to
introduce evidence of conduct for which the defendant had already been
tried.66 In Ashe v. Swenson,67 the defendant was acquitted of robbing one of
64. Id. at 792. The Court found that the CCE charge included acts after the guilty plea to the
Washington state charge.
65. The Court stated at one point in the opinion, "[o]ne who insists that the music stop and the
piper be paid at a particular point must at least have stopped dancing himself before he may seek such
an accounting," Id. at 790. Although the Court made repeated reference to the continuing nature of
the defendant's conduct, that cannot be the basis for holding that double jeopardy does not bar the
CCE prosecution because the Washington state charge had already been completed at the time of the
indictment on the CCE charges. See Thomas, Elegant Theory, supra note 29, at 877 (opinion never
explains why subsequent conduct forfeits double jeopardy protection of earlier conviction). Professor
Thomas criticizes the majority opinion by Justice Rehnquist for misstating the record to imply that the
defendant continued his criminal conduct beyond the time of the Washington state charge. Id. at 877
n.289.
66. The collateral estoppel component of the double jeopardy protection arises in cases in which
the defendant has been acquitted and the government brings a second charge that raises issues
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six poker players, after which the state sought to try him for robbing one of
the other players.68 The Court held that double jeopardy includes the
doctrine of collateral estoppel, such that "when an issue of ultimate fact has
once been determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again
be litigated between the same parties in any future lawsuit. ' 69 Although the
second prosecution in Ashe would pass muster under Blockburger because it
necessarily involved a different element, i.e., robbery of a different victim, the
state could not use the first trial as a "dry run," forcing the defendant to face
repeated attempts to convict him for essentially the same criminal act.7 °
While Ashe prevents relitigation of an ultimate fact decided in the
defendant's favor, the Court held in Dowling v. United States7t that collateral
estoppel does not bar all uses of acquitted conduct in a subsequent prosecu-
tion. The defendant in Dowling was convicted of committing a bank robbery
during which he wore a ski mask and carried a small pistol. The government
introduced testimony at trial implicating the defendant in a home robbery in
which the perpetrator wore a mask and carried a small handgun, but for
which he had previously been acquitted.72 The evidence went to the jury
pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), which permits a trial court to
admit evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts for any purpose other than to
prove the defendant's bad character.7 3 The government need only show that
litigated in the first prosecution. The second prosecution must meet the requirements of Blockburger;
otherwise, the proceeding is a straightforward violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause's prohibition
on retrying a defendant for the same offense. Professor Thomas argues that nothing prevents a
defendant from raising collateral estoppel even if the prior prosecution did not end in an acquittal.
See Thomas, Elegant Theory, supra note 29, at 867-68. If the defendant is convicted in the first trial,
however, there can be no collateral estoppel effect because the issue was not decided in the
defendant's favor. The only other possible circumstance in which such a claim could arise, is where
the prior trial ended in a hung jury on some counts and an acquittal on other counts. If the
government seeks to retry a defendant on the hung counts, the defendant could argue that the
government is precluded from raising any issues related to those acquitted counts. That is not
technically collateral estoppel, which requires that there be a separate action, but direct estoppel
arising from a prior determination in the same case. The retrial is not a separate proceeding, but a
continuation of the earlier trial. See United States v. Bailin, 977 F.2d 270, 276 (7th Cir. 1992) (quoting
18 CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4418 (1991)).
67. 397 U.S. 436 (1970).
68. Id. at 438-40. The Court noted that, in the second trial, the testimony of eyewitnesses was
"substantially stronger" through enhanced recollections of the robbers. Id. at 440.
69. Id. at 443.
70. Id. at 447. "[The question] is simply whether, after a jury determined by its verdict that the
petitioner was not one of the robbers, the State could constitutionally hale him before a new jury to
litigate that issue again." Id. at 446.
71. 493 U.S. 342 (1990).
72. Id. at 344-45.
73.
(b) Other crimes, wrongs or acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not
admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity
therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive,
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it is more likely than not that the prior acts occurred, a much lower standard
of proof than beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court held thatAshe does not
exclude use of evidence of prior acquitted conduct unless the defendant can
prove that the acquittal in the first trial forecloses the possibility that the
defendant committed the act.74
Ashe and Dowling further demonstrate the continuing tension in defining
the scope of what constitutes the "same offence" for double jeopardy
purposes by presenting two different ways to determine whether an acquittal
governs an ultimate issue in a successive prosecution. Ashe takes a broader
approach, putting a limit on the government's ability to subdivide a criminal
prosecution into a series of discrete cases, thereby denying the government
the chance to rehearse its presentation and seek a conviction through
repeated trials. That approach upholds the value of giving fair weight to the
jury's decision and the defendant's interest in the finality of a verdict. But
Dowling takes a restrictive view that gives a verdict only the immediate effect
of preventing a retrial of the particular crime for which the government
prosecuted the defendant. An acquittal does not mean that the alleged
criminal conduct is forever erased, because the government can make a
limited use of it as proof in a second proceeding to show the defendant's
knowledge, motive, intent, or lack of mistake. Dowling places the burden on
the defendant to demonstrate that the prior acquittal determined an ultimate
issue that precludes the government from reintroducing evidence of the
conduct in a later proceeding.75
The Supreme Court did not, however, determine just how distinct the
second prosecution must be from the first so that the acquittal does not affect
an ultimate issue in the later proceeding, and introduction of acquitted
conduct through Rule 404(b) is appropriate. Ashe and Dowling set up the
polar extremes in which an acquittal may decide an ultimate issue. In
Dowling, the conduct involved two distinct crimes two weeks apart, while
Ashe involved one robbery with multiple victims. The prosecutor in Dowling,
unlike Ashe, did not use the home robbery trial as a rehearsal for the bank
robbery, and the acquitted conduct did not specifically prove any of the
elements of the second crime that the government was required to estab-
lish.76 It is unclear, however, what the collateral estoppel effect would be of
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or
accident ....
FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
74. Dowling, 493 U.S. at 350-35 1.
75. Id.
76. Although evidence admitted under Rule 404(b) can be used to prove intent, an element of all
crimes, evidence of other crimes, standing alone, cannot prove the intent to commit the specific crime
charged because the evidence relates to other acts that are not the subject of the prosecution. FED. R.
EVID. 404.
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an acquittal on one charge in a case involving a complex criminal act, such as
a securities fraud scheme over a period of time that includes potential
charges of wire fraud and interstate transportation of stolen securities, that
could be divided into separate indictments. The question goes back to
determining what the "same offence" is in the Double Jeopardy Clause.
The two sets of cases, Garrett! Vitale and Ashe/ Dowling, present compet-
ing approaches for determining the scope of the double jeopardy protection
in successive prosecution cases. Without a clear analysis of double jeopardy's
protection, the Court sowed greater confusion because it could not decide on
a rationale that a majority could adopt and apply consistently. Moreover, the
Court had not clearly distinguished between successive prosecution and
multiple punishment cases because it had not squarely considered whether
the Double Jeopardy Clause required any analysis beyond the Blockburger
test, as refined in Albernaz and Hunter.
III. ONCE MORE INTO THE BREACH: GRADY, DIXON, AND THE SHORT
LIFE OF THE SAME CONDUCT TEST
A. Grady v. Corbin: Attempting to Define Same Offense as Same Conduct
In Grady v. Corbin,7 the Court finally confronted the issue of determining
the scope of the Double Jeopardy Clause's protection in successive prosecu-
tion cases, and whether Blockburger furnished the sole governing principle. In
one of his final opinions for the Court, Justice Brennan delivered a majority
opinion giving an expansive reading of "same offence" that was the culmina-
tion of a process he began almost twenty years earlier in Ashe, when he
argued for a "same transaction" test for double jeopardy. 8
The defendant, Thomas Corbin, was in an automobile accident and
received traffic citations for failing to keep to the right and driving while
intoxicated. He pled guilty before the Town Justice Court, and a few weeks
later, he was sentenced to a $360 fine and a six-month license suspension. At
neither proceeding did Corbin or the prosecutors mention that the accident
killed a young couple. Shortly after the accident, but before his appearance
on the tickets, an assistant district attorney began investigating the deaths
and, three months later, a grand jury indicted Corbin for manslaughter. In a
bill of particulars, the district attorney indicated that the reckless acts that
77. 495 U.S. 508 (1990).
78. Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 453-54 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring) ("In my view, the
Double Jeopardy Clause requires the prosecution, except in the most limited circumstances, to join at
one trial all the charges against a defendant that grow out of a single criminal act, occurrence,
episode, or transaction."). See Diane M. Resch, Note, "High Comedy but Inferior Justice": The
Aftermath of Grady v. Corbin, 75 MARO. L. Rev. 265, 273 (1991) (Grady appears to be culmination of
Justice Brennan's attempts over the years to modify the Blockburger test); Barton, supra note 59, at
155 (Justice Brennan succeeded in enticing Court away from Blockburger "same evidence" test).
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the office would prove were operating a vehicle while intoxicated, failing to
keep to the right of the median, and driving at a speed in excess of what the
weather and road conditions permitted.79
The majority began by relying on the dicta in Vitale to create a two-prong
double jeopardy analysis. First, it applied the Blockburger test to determine
whether the government charged the same offense. That test alone was
insufficient, however, because multiple prosecutions give the government an
unfair advantage over a defendant by allowing "an opportunity to rehearse
its presentation of proof, thus increasing the risk of an erroneous conviction
for one or more of the offenses charged."'80 The Court held that "the Double
Jeopardy Clause bars any subsequent prosecution in which the government,
to establish an essential element of an offense charged in that prosecution,
will prove conduct that constitutes an offense for which the defendant has
already been prosecuted."'', The second step, then is to determine what
conduct the government will prove, to ascertain whether the defendant has
already been prosecuted for that conduct. The state's admission in its bill of
particulars made clear that it would use two instances of previously pros-
ecuted conduct, failing to keep right of the median and driving while
intoxicated, to prove the manslaughter charges.
The majority opinion denied that it had adopted the "same transaction"
test that Justice Brennan first proposed in Ashe. The hallmark of the same
transaction test is that the government must bring all charges against a
defendant in a single proceeding. The same conduct test, on the other hand,
may permit a second prosecution of the defendant because the government
can introduce evidence of different conduct, such as driving with excessive
speed, to prosecute the defendant.82 Although not as broad as the same
transaction approach, the same conduct test was a much more expansive
understanding of "same offence" than Blockburger because the Court looked
beyond the statutory language and legislative history of the crimes charged.
The same conduct test forced a court to immerse itself in the government's
theory of the case and the facts of the prior criminal proceeding.
While Grady gave a broader meaning to "same offence" than the Court
had offered previously, the opinion was almost bereft of guidelines for
determining whether a second prosecution sought to use previously pros-
ecuted conduct. The failure of the district attorney's office to exercise due
diligence permitted the Court to look at the underlying facts without consid-
ering the defendant's culpability for the crime because the institutional
blame for the result falls solely on the individual prosecutors. Moreover,
79. Grady, 495 U.S. at 511-14.
80. Id. at 518.
81. Id. at 521.
82. Id. at 523. The Court had already rejected the same transaction test in Garrett. 471 U.S. at 790.
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Grady was an easy case under the same conduct test because the state
specifically admitted that it would use the two acts for which Corbin was
punished.
Absent such an admission, a court that takes an expansive view of the same
conduct test could essentially convert the test into Justice Brennen's twenty-
year-old same transaction test, because the court would likely presume that
the government introduced evidence of all possible theories of a defendant's
guilt to secure a conviction in the first prosecution. Because the second trial
has not yet commenced, a reviewing court does not have the benefit of the
record of the second proceeding to compare what conduct the government
sought to prove with what was previously prosecuted. If the government does
not prosecute all possible offenses in the first proceeding, then an expansive
view of Grady may foreclose it from bringing any other charges because the
government will have already proved the conduct that will be the basis for a
later prosecution.83 That, of course, is at the center of the same transaction
test advocated by Justice Brennan, although Grady denied that it adopted
such an approach.
Justice O'Connor criticized Grady as being inconsistent with Dowling,
which the Court had decided only a few months earlier.8 4 Any perceived
inconsistency, however, was a function of viewing the Court's double jeop-
ardy decisions as establishing clear rules that could be consistently applied.
The applicability of the collateral estoppel component of double jeopardy
requires courts to make fine distinctions between whether the government is
prosecuting conduct that was the subject of a prior prosecution or merely
introducing evidence that may be probative of guilt for a different crime.
Grady did not necessarily eviscerate Dowling because its same conduct test
was so amorphous. Grady was similar to Ashe in that when a second
prosecution closely tracks the evidence and theory of the prior prosecution, it
raises an obvious question of whether the government is unfairly seeking to
achieve its goal of punishing the defendant by creating a second opportunity
to permit imposition of a criminal sentence. Grady epitomized the circum-
stance in which the government's own inability to coordinate its prosecutorial
resources should not serve as the basis for a second criminal prosecution.
Viewed in that light, Grady was directed more toward policing prosecutorial
misconduct than advancing a principled expansion of the scope of double
jeopardy or a conscious effort to limit the holding in Dowling.
A more difficult question that Grady failed to address was whether
Garrett's multilayered conduct approach to using prior offenses in subse-
quent prosecutions retained any viability. Garrett approached the question of
83. Grady, 495 U.S. at 527 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
84. Id. at 524-25 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor charged that Grady "effectively
renders our holding in Dowling a nullity in many circumstances." Id. at 525.
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whether a CCE prosecution could incorporate prior prosecuted conduct
essentially as a Blockburger question, determining that double jeopardy does
not prohibit using the earlier offenses as predicates for the later conviction
because Congress intended to create a separate offense in the CCE provi-
sion." Adopting a similar approach in Grady, Justice Scalia dissented on the
ground that Blockburger was the established test for ascertaining whether
successive prosecutions violated the Double Jeopardy Clause.86 Justice Scalia
argued that the elements test "best gives effect to the language of the Clause,
which protects individuals from being twice put in jeopardy 'for the same
offence,' not for the same conduct or actions."787
The majority opinion in Grady criticized Justice Scalia's argument in favor
of applying Blockburger as the exclusive test of double jeopardy violations
because all of the cases that he cited involved multiple punishments, not
successive prosecutions. 88 Although that is superficially true, before Grady
the Court had never fully distinguished between the two forms of double
jeopardy protection, and had never held that they required different forms of
analysis. Grady overlooked Garrett's entire application of Blockburger- to a
successive prosecution case, and made no attempt to reconcile the same
conduct test with Garrett's analysis.
B. The Lower Courts Constrict Grady
As Justice Scalia proposed in his Grady dissent and exemplified in Garrett,
Grady was irreconcilable with the application of the Blockburger test for
successive prosecutions unless its rationale was limited to a narrow range of
cases. After Grady, one possible approach to Garrett would be to limit the use
of prior prosecuted conduct to situations in which the second proceeding
involved transactions occurring after the first prosecution. In Diaz v. United
States,89 the Court suggested such an approach by recognizing an exception
to double jeopardy where the crime prosecuted in the second prosecution
had not been ripe for prosecution at the time of the first criminal trial.9 ° Such
an approach would require the government to present affirmative evidence of
continuing criminal activity after the first prosecution, or newly discovered
evidence not previously available upon the exercise of due diligence. This
approach would likely prevent subsequent prosecutions when the
government's evidence concerns activity occurring only before the first trial.
85. 471 U.S. at 779. Grady almost completely ignored Garrett, citing it only once for the proposition
that Blockburger "was developed 'in the context of multiple punishments imposed in a single
prosecution.' " 495 U.S. at 516.
86. Grady, 495 U.S. at 528 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
87. Id. at 529 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
88. Id. at 517 n.8.
89. 223 U.S. 442 (1912).
90. Id. at 448-49. The defendant was prosecuted for assault and battery, and when the victim died
after the first trial, the government brought murder charges.
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Most lower courts, however, rejected such an approach to reconciling
Grady and Garrett. They opted instead to read Grady narrowly.91 In United
States v. Esposito,92 the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit considered
whether double jeopardy barred a second prosecution for the underlying
substantive offenses after the defendant was acquitted on a RICO charge
based on those underlying offenses. 93 While the lower courts had unani-
mously held that RICO is a separate offense from any predicate offenses,
Esposito presented a different scenario in two respects: first, the defendant
was tried for the RICO violations before the substantive offenses, making
this a "reverse" RICO prosecution; second, none of the crimes charged in
the second indictment occurred after the first trial, and all could have been
brought together in the first indictment.
The Third Circuit found the order of prosecution to be unimportant
because the Congressional intent in enacting RICO makes it abundantly
clear that the statutes create different crimes that may be prosecuted
separately without violating double jeopardy.94 The circuit court then held
that Garrett remained as controlling law, and found that the same conduct
test did not "derogate from the Garrett holding."95
The Third Circuit never considered how Esposito differed from Garrett
factually, especially that Esposito's second prosecution did not involve continu-
ing criminal conduct after the first trial. Instead, the circuit court merely
asserted that Grady did not affect the Garrett analysis of criminal prosecu-
tions involving complex statutes without attempting to reconcile Grady and
Garrett.96 The Esposito court tried to rationalize its conclusion by noting that
91. See United States v. O'Connor, 953 F.2d 338, 342-43 (7th Cir.) (Grady did not affect the holding
in Garrett), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1979 (1992); United States v. Evans, 951 F.2d 729, 737 (6th Cir.
1991) (case more nearly resembles Garrett than Grady), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1966 (1992); United
States v. Arnoldt, 947 F.2d 1120, 1126 (4th Cir. 1991) (Grady governs the paradigmatic single course
of conduct case, not RICO or CCE prosecutions), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1666 (1992); United States v.
Gonzalez, 921 F.2d 1530, 1537-38 (11th Cir.) (Grady does not overrule Garrett, but in fact cites it),
cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 178 (1991); United Statesv. Esposito, 912 F.2d 60, 65 (3d Cir. 1990) (Grady and
Garrett are reconcilable), cert. dismissed, 111 S. Ct. 806 (1991); United States v. Pungitore, 910 F.2d
1084, 1109 (3d Cir. 1990) (Grady logically extends only to offenses arising from a single discrete
event).
92. 912 F.2d 60, cert. dismissed, 111 S. Ct. 806 (1991).
93. Id. at 61. The first indictment charged the defendant with conspiracy to violate RICO and
participation in a racketeering enterprise involving drug distribution. The second indictment charged
drug distribution involving the same transactions as alleged in the first indictment. Id.
94. Id. at 63 ("[Niothing in the legislative history suggests that Congress intended RICO to be a
substitute for the predicate offense; instead, that history unequivocally demonstrates Congress saw
RICO as a new and additional enforcement tool.").
95. Id. at 65.
96. See Scott Taylor Sheffer, "Reverse RICO" Double Jeopardy Protection under United States v.
Esposito: Someone's in the Kitchen with Grady, but It's Not the Third Circuit, 1991 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1107,
1120 ("The Third Circuit's application of Grady was flawed and its outcome is insupportable.").
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any other double jeopardy analysis would effectively require the government
to bring all charges in a single prosecution, resulting in unwieldy trials
involving multiple defendants and charges. 97 Esposito made it clear that
Grady would not have an immediate impact on successive prosecutions using
complex criminal statutes that involve multilayered conduct.
While the Supreme Court might ignore Garrett in Grady, the lower courts,
in accordance with the Third Circuit's approach in Esposito, generally
refused to accord Grady a broad impact on the scope of the Double Jeopardy
Clause by relying on Garrett's analysis. In United States v. Gonzalez,98 the
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that Grady applies only to
cases involving "single act crimes," while Garrett permits the use of previ-
ously prosecuted conduct in prosecutions for complex crimes, such as RICO. 99
In United States v. Arnoldt,'00 the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
confined Grady to a limited range of cases, reasoning that "[w]hen grappling
with a complex, multilayered-conduct statute such as RICO, the government
must be given reasonable discretion in setting and pursuing its strategy." 10' 1
The circuit court did not want to adopt a rule that could require the
government to forego prosecuting predicate acts while it waited to determine
whether or not to bring charges under one of the complex criminal stat-
utes.10 2 The Fourth Circuit even recognized that "Grady does not limit itself
to a specific class of crimes,"' 0 3 yet the court was unwilling to apply the same
conduct test beyond the narrow range of cases involving a single transaction
to prosecutions that use conduct for which a person has already been tried
and convicted. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit was the only
court to go against the tide of restrictive interpretation of Grady. In United
States v. Calderone,10 4 that court held that "the 'same conduct' test an-
nounced in Grady applies to all double jeopardy claims arising in the context
of successive prosecutions." 0 5
97. 912 F.2d at 67. It is not clear from the opinion why considerations of judicial economy and
practicality should determine whether a defendant can assert a constitutional right. See United States
v. Calderone, 917 F.2d 717, 723 (2d Cir. 1990), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 1657 (1992) (Newman, J., concurring)
("I doubt if the double jeopardy analysis should become less rigorous simply because Congress has
defined more complicated crimes.").
98. 921 F.2d 1530.
99. Id. at 1537-38.
100. 947 F.2d 1120.
101. Id. at 1127.
102. Id.; see O'Connor, 953 F.2d at 344 (legitimate requirements of law enforcement make a
compelling case for permitting deferral of prosecutorial decisions under RICO). O'Connor reached a
conclusion similar to Esposito, holding that Garrett is not limited to cases in which the criminal
conduct continues beyond the first trial. Id.
103. Arnoldt, 947 F.2d at 1127.
104. 917 F.2d 717 (2d Cir. 1990), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 1657 (1992).
105. Id. at 721.
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C. Grady Skates on Thin Ice: United States v. Felix
The Supreme Court rejected a broad application of Grady two terms later
in United States v. Felix."°6 The defendant was convicted of attempted
manufacture of methamphetamine in August, 1987, in a federal district court
in Missouri. Thereafter, he was convicted in a federal district court in
Oklahoma of conspiracy and substantive charges of possessing and manufac-
turing methamphetamine between May and August, 1987, in Oklahoma. In
the Missouri trial, the government introduced evidence under Federal Rule
of Evidence 404(b) of the defendant's involvement in manufacturing metham-
phetamine in Oklahoma in order to establish intent.1 0 7 In the Oklahoma
indictment, two of the nine overt acts alleged were conduct for which the
defendant had been prosecuted in Missouri.' 8 The Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit reversed certain counts of the Oklahoma conviction because
"the significant duplication of conduct proved in each trial" meant that the
defendant's conviction violated the same conduct test articulated in Grady.10 9
The Supreme Court first considered the issue of whether use of the
Oklahoma conduct in the Missouri trial bars a subsequent prosecution for
that conduct. It found that the defendant was not prosecuted in Missouri for
the Oklahoma conduct because "the introduction of relevant evidence of
particular misconduct in a case is not the same thing as prosecution for that
conduct." ' 0 The Court then turned to the harder question of whether
conduct for which a defendant has already been convicted can be alleged as
an overt act to prove a separate conspiracy charge. The Court noted that,
"[t]aken out of context, and read literally," Grady's same conduct test would
likely prohibit the second prosecution. 1t
Yet the Court "decline[d] to read the language so expansively, because of
the context in which Grady arose and because of difficulties which have
already arisen in its interpretation.""'  Instead, the Court distinguished
106. 112 S. Ct. 1377 (1992).
107. The defense in the Missouri trial was that the defendant had acted " 'under the mistaken
belief that he was working in a covert DEA operation."' Id. at 1380 (quoting United States v. Felix,
867 F.2d 1068, 1074 (8th Cir. 1989)). The government raided the methamphetamine lab on July 13,
1987, but the defendant avoided arrest by hiding in nearby woods. Id.
108. The two overt acts involved providing money to purchase chemicals and equipment for
manufacturing methamphetamine, and possession of the chemicals and equipment. Id.
109. Id. at 1381.
110. Id. at 1383. The Court noted that the principle adopted in Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S.
342 (1990), controls the question of whether introduction of evidence of other crimes constitutes a
double jeopardy violation. Felix, 112 S. Ct. at 1383 n.3. Dowling specifically dealt with the collateral
estoppel effect of introducing evidence of previously acquitted conduct under Rule 404(b), which is
not an issue in Felix because the defendant had not yet been prosecuted for the Oklahoma conduct at
the time of the Missouri trial. Id.
111. Felix, 112 S. Ct. at 1383-84.
112. Id. at 1384.
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between the simple factual context of Grady and its predecessors, and
precedents that uphold the rule permitting separate prosecutions for con-
spiracy and the underlying substantive offense."t 3 The primary precedent the
Court relied on to support the distinction between cases arising out of a
single course of conduct and prosecutions for engaging in multilayered
conduct was Garrett. The Court found that Grady was "less helpful" once the
circumstances proceed beyond the lesser included offense analysis endorsed
in that decision. 1
14
The Court never explained why Grady should be limited to prosecutions
arising out of a single course of conduct, beyond its desire to maintain what it
saw as a long-standing rule permitting separate prosecutions of a conspiracy
and its underlying offense. Moreover, the Court refused to give any guidance
as to how Grady should be understood even when it was applicable, stating
only that it was difficult to discern the difference between the same transac-
tion test that it had rejected and the same conduct test adopted in Grady.1"5
Although the Court sought to limit its holding in Felix to the straightforward
case of successive prosecutions for conspiracy and a substantive offense, 116 its
refusal to read Grady expansively seht a clear signal that the same conduct
test was an aberration that should not be given weight beyond a restricted
range of cases.
While the initial question had been whether Garrett survived Grady, the
issue shifted to whether Grady had any precedential value after Felix. Justice
Scalia, who would later write the majority opinion sending the same conduct
test to its repose, displayed considerable prescience about Grady's viability in
his dissent in that case, stating that an opinion "so unsupported in reason and
so absurd in application is unlikely to survive."" 7
D. Blockburger's Ascendancy: United States v. Dixon
Grady survived its first attack in Felix bloodied and somewhat bowed. The
Court had established a two-tier analysis for double jeopardy claims raised in
successive prosecution cases, assuming that the prosecution passes the initial
113. Id. ("But long antedating any of these cases, and not questioned in any of them, is the rule that
a substantive crime, and a conspiracy to commit that crime, are not the 'same offense' for double
jeopardy purposes."). See Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 643 (1946) (classic understanding
of conspiracy charge is that defendant is prosecuted for the agreement to commit the crime, which is
distinct from the crime itself).
114. Felix, 112 S. Ct. at 1385.
115. Id.
116. Id. ("We think it best not to enmesh in such subtleties the established doctrine that a
conspiracy to commit a crime is a separate offense from the crime itself.").
117. Grady, 495 U.S. at 543 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Blockburger analysis." 8 If the prosecution arose from a single course of
events, then the question was whether the succeeding case violated Grady's
proscription on prosecuting the same conduct in a second proceeding. If the
case involved multilayered conduct, then Felix and Garrett would permit a
second prosecution if the crimes are different under the Blockburger test. The
question, therefore, was assessing the nature of the criminal conduct at issue
in the prosecutions to determine which analytic model to apply.' 19 Felix did
not provide any guidance in distinguishing between these two forms of
conduct, and the issue was whether there was any reliable means to deter-
mine whether a second prosecution must meet the broader same conduct
test.
Rather than grapple with reconciling the two forms of analysis, the Court
opted to overrule Grady in United States v. Dixon.t 20 Dixon adopts the
Blockburger test as the exclusive guide to the double jeopardy analysis, but the
majority could not even agree on how that seemingly straightforward test
should be applied. Instead of bringing lucidity to the double jeopardy inquiry,
however, the Court continued its tradition of adopting a shifting analysis that
defies consistent application.
1. Factual Background
The Court considered two companion cases arising out of criminal con-
tempt prosecutions for violating judicial orders, and subsequent prosecutions
for violating the underlying substantive provisions that were the subject of
the contempt proceedings. In the first case, Alvin Dixon was arrested for
murder and released on bail; he was then indicted for drug distribution while
out on bail.'' A condition of his release on the murder charge was that he
not commit any criminal offense, and violation of the release order would
118. Felix did not question Grady's analysis of Blockburger's role as the initial step in the double
jeopardy analysis. Justice Scalia's dissent in Grady, which was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, had
argued that Blockburger should be the sole test of whether a double jeopardy violation exists. The
Chief Justice's opinion in Felix, however, makes no mention of that position. That may be explained by
the fact that Felix's limitation of Grady permits courts to apply the Garrett analysis, which is essentially
an application of Blockburger, to determine whether the complex criminal statute creates a different
offense from the underlying predicate offenses. See supra text accompanying note 65 (reviewing
Garrett double jeopardy analysis).
119. See United States v. Maza, 983 F.2d 1004, 1011 (11th Cir. 1993) (for successive prosecutions,
question of whether defendant is being prosecuted for the same offense requires a "determination
that the underlying facts that gave rise to the first prosecution are, or are not the sole basis for the
second"); McIntyre v. Trickey, 975 F.2d 437, 442 (8th Cir. 1992) (Grady applies "where criminal
activity limited to a 'single course of conduct' rather than certain types of 'multilayered conduct' ");
Sharpton v. Turner, 964 F.2d 1284, 1289 (2d Cir.) ("Nothing in Grady, as illuminated by Felix, would
prevent proof of offense A by evidence of conduct that is a lesser-included offense B within a
previously prosecuted greater offense C."), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 494 (1992).
120. 113 S. Ct. 2849 (1993).
121. Id. at 2853.
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subject him to prosecution for contempt of court.' 22 Dixon was convicted of
violating the release order by engaging in the drug violation contained in the
later indictment and sentenced to 180 days in jail.123 He then moved to
dismiss the drug indictment on double jeopardy grounds.'2 4
The second defendant, Michael Foster, was subject to a civil protection
order (CPO) issued at the request of his estranged wife.' 25 The order
required that Foster not "molest, assault, or in any manner threaten or
physically abuse" his wife.126 The superior court held a contempt hearing to
consider whether three alleged threats and two alleged assaults violated the
CPO,127 and the wife's attorney prosecuted the matter.1 2 8 Although the
government did not participate in the prosecution, it was aware of the alleged
violations because a grand jury was investigating some of the same con-
duct. 129 The court acquitted Foster of violating the CPO for the three threats,
and found him guilty on the two assaults. 30 The government then procured a
five-count indictment against Foster, charging him with simple assault,
threatening to injure or kidnap, and assault with intent to kill, with each
count based on one of the five incidents considered in the CPO contempt
proceedings. 31 The trial court refused to dismiss the subsequent indictment
on double jeopardy grounds. 132
2. The Blockburger Analysis
The Court first held that the Double Jeopardy Clause applies to nonsum-
mary criminal contempt proceedings in the same manner as it does to any
other criminal prosecution. 33 That leads to the Blockburger analysis, in which
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 2853-54.
126. Id. at 2854.
127. The alleged threats took place on November 12, 1987, and March 26 and May 17, 1988, while
the alleged assaults took place on November 6, 1987 and May 21, 1988. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130, Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 2855. The Court had to consider the question of the application of double jeopardy to
criminal contempt because courts traditionally had not issued injunctions or orders prohibiting
violations of other legal provisions. Nevertheless, the application of the constitutional protection was
easily decided: "We think it obvious, and today hold, that the protection of the Double Jeopardy
Clause likewise attaches" to contempt proceedings. Id. Although judicial injunctions directing a
person to obey the law are a recent phenomenon, they are widely used in the securities context, in
which the Securities and Exchange Commission will usually settle cases with the issuance of an
administrative or judicial injunction prohibiting the defendant from committing future violations of
specific provisions of the securities laws. See William R. McLucas et al., Settlement of Insider Trading
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the Court compared the elements of the contempt violation with those of the
underlying substantive criminal provisions to find that double jeopardy
prohibited the subsequent prosecution of Dixon and one count of Foster's
indictment.' On this point, the Court splintered over the proper application
of the same elements test. Only Justice Kennedy joined Justice Scalia's
opinion on the application of the Blockburger test,
135 while Justices White, 136
Blackmun, 37 Stevens, and Souter 38 concurred in finding a double jeopardy
violation while rejecting the decision to overrule Grady. Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor and Thomas dissented from Justice Scalia's
opinion on this point, arguing for a stricter application of Blockburger.'39
In Dixon's case, the entire criminal code was incorporated into the release
order, a situation found comparable to the lesser included offense analysis
adopted by the Court in Harris. Similarly, the first count of Foster's indict-
ment, charging simple assault, was identical to one of the counts of conviction
in the CPO contempt proceeding, which also found him guilty of a simple
assault in violation of the order. By incorporating the underlying substantive
criminal offenses, the contempt proceedings contain all of the elements of
the subsequent proceedings. Therefore, according to Justice Scalia, the later
prosecutions fail the Blockburger test because there is no new element that
must be proved in the second proceeding that has not already been incorpo-
rated in the original contempt prosecution.
140
The other counts of Foster's indictment, however, survive the Blockburger
test because they involve elements other than those at issue in the contempt
proceeding. Foster was indicted for assault with intent to kill, which entails
the added element of specific intent to kill which was not proved in the earlier
prosecution for simple assault.' 4 1 Similarly, the three counts charging threats
to injure or kidnap involve specific aggravating factual elements while the
CPO prohibited Foster only from "in any manner threaten[ing]" his wife.142
On this point, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor and Thomas
concurred in Justice Scalia's analysis, 143 while the other four Justices dis-
Cases with the SEC, 48 Bus. LAW. 79, 86 (1992) (discussing SEC remedies, including injunctions for
future violations).
134. Dixon, 113 S. Ct. at 2856-57.
135. Id. at 2853.
136. Id. at 2868. (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
137. Id. at 2879 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
138. Id. at 2881 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
139. Id. at 2865 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
140. Id. at 2858 ("Because Dixon's drug offense did not include any element not contained in his
previous contempt offense, his subsequent prosecution violates the Double Jeopardy Clause.").
141. Id. at 2858-59.
142. ld. at 2859.
143. Id. at 2865 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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sented from this application of Blockburger that permitted the successive
prosecution of Foster.144
Justice Scalia's application of the elements test to the different sets of
charges is not entirely consistent. He ignores the fact that a required element
of both Dixon's and Foster's contempt convictions is knowledge of the order
prohibiting the alleged violation, which is not an element of the underlying
substantive crimes. 4 5 Using Harris as authority, he asserts that Dixon's drug
violation "is 'a species of lesser-included offense,' ""' without explaining
why the disparity in the elements that must be proved in the different
prosecutions does not otherwise pass muster under Blockburger. Moreover,
Justice Scalia then cites that very element as a reason for finding that four
counts of Foster's indictment do not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause
under the Blockburger analysis.' 47
He argues that all of the elements of the substantive crimes that the
government may not prosecute were included in the contempt convictions,
and therefore they violate the double jeopardy protection.' 48 That would not
be true, however, if the sequence of the prosecutions were reversed by having
the substantive criminal trials before the contempt proceedings. When
prosecuted in that order, then it appears that all of the elements of the first
case would not be included in the second because there is no need to prove
knowledge (or even the existence) of the CPO or release order, which should
result in the contempt prosecution surviving a double jeopardy challenge
under Blockburger. It is odd, however, that the temporal relationship of the
proceedings should govern the application of the constitutional protection,
rather than any stronger underlying principle of law.
Chief Justice Rehnquist argues that "Justice Scalia's double-jeopardy
analysis bears a striking resemblance to that found in Grady-not what one
would expect in an opinion that overrules Grady."'49 The Blockburger analy-
sis of those counts against Dixon and Foster that were reversed looks beyond
just the elements of the different violations to determine whether the first
prosecution incorporates the entirety of the second set of charges, engaging
in a factual review of the scope of the first proceeding. In his dissent in Grady,
Justice Scalia argued that the lesser-included offense analysis of Harris
"occurs where a statutory offense expressly incorporates another statutory
offense without specifying the latter's elements."' 50 That is not, however, the
type of analysis undertaken in Dixon. Instead, Justice Scalia analyzes whether
144. Id. at 2868, 2880, 2891.
145. Id. at 2891 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
146. Id. at 2857.
147. Id. at 2858-59.
148. Id. at 2858.
149. Id. at 2867 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
150. 495 U.S. at 508, 528 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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the prior contempt proceeding subsumes the elements of the later charges
without simply comparing the elements of the different provisions.' 5 I While
that approach to the Blockburger test is not as broad as the Grady same
conduct test, as Chief Justice Rehnquist alleges, 1 2 it shows a greater
flexibility in looking past just the elements of the two prosecutions to
determine whether the Double Jeopardy Clause has been violated.
What makes Justice Scalia's analysis even more confusing is the treatment
of the other four counts in Foster's indictment. This approach is much closer
to the strict application of Blockburger advocated by Chief Justice Re-
hnquist.' 5 3 Justice Scalia finds arguably irrelevant differences between the
elements of the different prosecutions of Foster to support the conclusion
that the second prosecution does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause.'54
On the assault with intent to kill count, Justice Scalia asserts that the specific
intent element differentiates it from simple assault.' 55 As Justice White
points out, however, simple assault is a lesser-included offense of assault with
intent to kill, so if the jury were to convict on the lesser-included offense, then
the court would be barred by double jeopardy from entering a conviction on
that count.'56 The different types of intent required for the two crimes are
closely related, and it is unclear why prosecution for the lesser-included
offense, simple assault, is prohibited but not for the greater offense, assault
with intent to kill, that incorporates it. Similarly, Justice Scalia argues that
the CPO provision ordering that Foster not "in any manner threaten" is
much broader than the substantive criminal provision covering threats to
harm or kidnap.'5 7 The alleged differences in coverage between the prohibi-
tions on threatening between the CPO and the criminal provisions are
superficial because a threat to harm or kidnap likely falls within the meaning
of "in any manner threaten," constituting a species of lesser-included of-
fense. Nevertheless, that forms the basis for finding the requisite variation
between the elements of the offenses.
As reflected by the fragmented voting in Dixon, Justice Scalia's analysis of
Blockburger applies both a more flexible approach to the same elements test
that looks to whether a provision is a "species of lesser-included offense,"
151. Dixon, 113 S. Ct. at 2857.
152. Id. at 2867.
153. Id. at 2865.
154. Id. at 2858-59.
155. Id. at 2858.
156. ld. at 2877-78 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Scalia responds
that this merely points out that one offense may be a lesser included offense of more than one other
crime. Id. at 2859 n.7. That does not, however, address the point that preventing the government from
placing a defendant at risk of being convicted a second time for the same offense is one of the
underlying values the Double Jeopardy Clause seeks to protect. Id. at 2878 (White, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
157. Id. at 2857-58.
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and the strict Blockburger analysis advocated by Chief Justice Rehnquist. It is
unclear how much guidance lower courts can take from the decision because
Justice Scalia's opinion appears to support either approach to a double
jeopardy challenge.
3. The Demise of Grady
Upon concluding its Blockburger analysis, the Court then turned to the
same conduct test. The Court noted that Grady would "undoubtedly"
prohibit the subsequent prosecution of Foster on the four counts of the
indictment that passed the same elements test because the government can
prove only the exact same conduct in the second proceeding.'58 Rather than
considering additional limitations on Grady, the majority instead overruled
the case. The court stated that unlike the Blockburger test, which "has deep
historical roots and has been accepted in numerous precedents of this Court,
Grady lacks constitutional roots."' 59 The Court expressly criticized Grady on
the ground that none of its prior precedents supported Grady's expansion of
the double jeopardy protection through the same conduct test.1 60
As a justification for overruling a precedent, the Court stated that Grady
"has already proved unstable in application," noting that the substantial
exception to the same conduct test recognized in Felix "gave cause for
concern that the rule was not an accurate expression of the law."' 6 , Rather
than embark on crafting yet another exception, "we think it time to acknowl-
edge what is now, three years after Grady, compellingly clear: the case was a
mistake. 1 62 The Court asserted that Grady had produced "confusion" in the
lower courts, which provides an additional reason to overrule the case
beyond any intrinsic analytical problems in the opinion. 63
Although lower courts expressed frustration with the ambiguous language
used for the same conduct test,164 even before Felix they had generally
158. Id. at 2860.
159. Id.
160. Id. The only opinion that specifically raised the possibility that double jeopardy might bar a
second prosecution for the same conduct was Illinois v. Vitale, 447 U.S. 410, 420 (1980), but the Court
in Dixon noted that Vitale stated only that a second prosecution based on the same conduct would
raise a substantial question under the Double Jeopardy Clause. The Court stated that it had never
construed that statement "as answering, rather than simply raising, the question on which we later
granted certiorari in Grady." Dixon, 113 S. Ct. at 2862.
161. Id. at 2863. It is interesting to note that the majority opinion in Felix did not express such
discomfiture with the limited reading of Grady, and none of the justices in the majority wrote
separately to explain their unease with Grady.
162. id. at 2864.
163. Id.
164. See, e.g., Sharpton, 964 F.2d at 1287 (quoted in Dixon, 113 S. Ct. at 2864) (Grady is "difficult to
apply," and Felix has not made analysis easier).
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limited Grady to cases arising from a single course of conduct.' 65 After Felix,
the lower courts had a clear indication from the Supreme Court that Grady
was confined to a narrow range of cases that did not prevent later proceed-
ings which incorporated conduct considered in a prior prosecution. 166 Dixon
overstates the problem of confusion purportedly caused by Grady; Justice
Scalia, even acknowledges that the same conduct test would produce an
uncontestable decision under the Double Jeopardy Clause to bar the succes-
sive prosecution of Foster.
1 67
In dissent, Justice Souter raises a more troublesome issue with the
exclusive reliance on the Blockburger test engendered by overruling Grady.
He argues that applying the same elements test as the sole determinant of the
constitutional protection works "an unprecedented truncation of the protec-
tion afforded by the Double Jeopardy Clause against successive prosecutions,
by transferring the government's leeway in determining how many offenses to
create to the assessment of how many times a person may be prosecuted for
the same conduct."' 68 The Blockburger test arose in the context of multiple
punishment cases, not successive prosecutions, and the Court made clear in
Whalen v. United States that it is only a rule of statutory construction in that
context. 169 Dixon elevates the same elements test to the governing constitu-
tional principle for successive prosecutions, but to the extent the rule is
applied strictly, as advocated by Chief Justice Rehnquist, it depends on the
legislature's definition of the elements of a crime for the substantive protec-
tions afforded by the Double Jeopardy Clause.
E. Applying Dixon's Broader Lesser-Included Offense Analysis to
Comprehensive Criminal Statutes
In the broader application of the lesser-included offense analysis in Dixon,
the Court examined whether the elements of one offense are incorporated
into another, rather than a strict comparison of the elements of the two
provisions. That approach may permit courts to engage in a broader inquiry
when double jeopardy claims are raised concerning whether comprehensive
statutory schemes incorporate more narrowly drawn provisions. Statutes that
require the government to prove separate underlying offenses that have
165. See supra text accompanying note 119 (reviewing cases permitting subsequent prosecutions for
multilayered conduct).
166. See, e.g., McIntyre, 975 F.2d at 442 (Grady only applies to crimes involving single course of
conduct rather than multilayered conduct); Dixon, 113 S. Ct. at 2889 (Souter, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (overruling Grady "is not justified by the fact that two Courts of Appeals
decisions have described it as difficult to apply").
167. Dixon, 113 S. Ct. at 2860.
168. Id. at 2890 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
169. 445 U.S. 684, 691-92 (1980).
[Vol. 31:1
DOUBLE JEOPARDY
different elements from the charged offense have generally survived double
jeopardy challenges, even before the Court overruled Grady. Lower courts
have found that CCE,17 0 RICO, 71 and Money Laundering1 71 offenses are
separate from the substantive offenses on which the statutes are built.
For statutes that do not explicitly incorporate other crimes as an element
of the offense, the question after Dixon is how broad is the unit of conduct
encompassed by the statutes at issue. Previously, under Grady, if two statutes
reached a single execution of criminal conduct through a discrete act, then it
was unlikely that the same conduct could be used in a successive prosecution.
The issue under the Double Jeopardy Clause is now primarily one of
statutory interpretation through the Blockburger analysis: how broadly does
the statute in the successive prosecution incorporate the elements that may
be proved in a previous criminal action, without subsuming the statute at
issue in the prior case? That analysis is similar to the double jeopardy
protection against multiplicitous indictments. 7 3 The court must establish the
unit of conduct proscribed by the statute to determine whether the second
prosecution has been the subject of the previous criminal action. If the
statutes cover the same unit of conduct, then under Dixon they may be a
species of lesser included offense that would bar the second prosecution
under the Double Jeopardy Clause.
The multiplicity issue arises in two contexts: multiple charges under the
same statute, and charges under separate provisions. In both instances, the
question is whether the indictment seeks to punish the same unit of conduct.
If an indictment is multiplicitous, then the government cannot seek any
greater punishment in successive prosecutions than a court could impose in a
single proceeding. The Supreme Court noted that, "Where the judge is
forbidden to impose cumulative punishment for two crimes at the end of a
single proceeding, the prosecutor is forbidden to strive for the same result in
170. See United States v. McHan, 966 F.2d 134 (4th Cir. 1992) (guilty plea to conspiracy to possess
marijuana does not bar subsequent CCE indictment in which conspiracy is one of the predicate acts);
United States v. Evans, 951 F.2d 729, 732 (6th Cir. 1991) (Grady does not disturb holding in Garrett
that CCE charge not barred when underlying conduct subject of prior prosecution), cert. denied, 112 S.
Ct. 1966 (1992); United States v. Erwin, 793 F.2d 656, 669 (5th Cir.) (prior RICO prosecution does
not bar CCE indictment involving same underlying offenses), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 991 (1986).
171. See O'Connor, 953 F.2d at 343 (conviction under RICO for acts already prosecuted not barred
by double jeopardy); Arnoldt, 947 F.2d at 1126 (RICO prosecutions target multilayered conduct and
not barred by double jeopardy).
172. See United States v. Edgmon, 952 F.2d 1206, 1213 (10th Cir. 1991) (under Garrett analysis,
Money Laundering is separate crime from the specified unlawful activity charged in indictment), cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 3037 (1992).
173. See United States v. Lemons, 941 F.2d 309, 317 (5th Cir. 1991) ('Multiplicity' is charging a
single offense in more than one count of an indictment."); Project, Twenty-Second Annual Review of
Criminal Procedure, 81 GEO. L.J. 853, 1084 (1993) [hereinafter 22nd Criminal Procedure Project]
("Indictments charging a single offense in different counts are multiplicitous.").
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successive proceedings.' 74 When there are multiple charges under the same
statute, the question is how far the provision will permit the conduct at issue
to be divided into separate criminal charges. When different statutes are
charged, the Blockburger test furnishes the basic approach to determining
whether proof of a violation of both statutes requires evidence of different
elements. Multiplicity occurs only in a single prosecution because the defen-
dant is challenging the government's power to seek multiple punishments in a
single proceeding.
Dixon may add a new layer to the Blockburger analysis of both multiplicity
and successive prosecutions by requiring courts to go beyond simply analyz-
ing the elements of the statutes to determine the unit of conduct covered by
the provision. Ascertaining the unit of conduct in conspiracy cases is a
paradigm of the continued need to consider the underlying conduct in
connection with the double jeopardy analysis.' 75 If the government first
charges a defendant with a substantive crime, and then conspiracy to commit
that crime, Felix permits the subsequent prosecution. If, however, the govern-
ment brings successive conspiracy prosecutions, the issue is whether there is
more than one agreement.
1 76
In United States v. Gambino, 7 7 the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
held that,
[t]he relevant inquiry for double jeopardy purposes in the context of
successive conspiracy prosecutions is whether the second prosecution is
for a conspiracy distinct from that previously prosecuted. If the second
prosecution is for a distinct conspiracy, there is no double jeopardy
problem regardless of an overt act or other evidentiary overlap. 178 Courts
look to various factors to determine whether the conspiracies charged are
truly distinct, including the overlap of time, place, participants, and overt
174. Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161,166 (1977).
175. See Anne Bowen Poulin, Double Jeopardy Protection Against Successive Prosecutions in Complex
Criminal Cases: A Model, 25 CONN. L. REV. 95, 124 (1992) (arguing for supplementing Grady by
adopting the totality of the circumstances test used to determine whether there is more than one
conspiracy).
176. See United States v. Thornton, 972 F.2d 764, 766 (7th Cir. 1992) ("the double jeopardy clause
prohibits multiple prosecutions for the same offense, and because the agreement is the sine qua non
of conspiracy, if the government twice prosecutes an individual under the same statute for what
essentially constitutes one agreement, this must constitute prosecution for the same offense in
violation of double jeopardy.").
177. 968 F.2d 227 (2d Cir. 1992).
178. [d. at 231. The Second Circuit had initially reversed the convictions on certain counts on the
ground that Grady prohibited a second prosecution that used previously prosecuted conduct as proof
of an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy. 920 F.2d 1108, 1112 (2d Cir. 1990). The circuit court
had earlier read Grady's same conduct test expansively in United States v. Calderone, 917 F.2d 717,
720-21 (2d Cir. 1990). The Supreme Court reversed both cases for reconsideration in light of Felix. 112
S. Ct. 1657 (1992).
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acts charged in the two cases, and the underlying criminal offenses.1 7 9 If
there is only one agreement, then there can only be one conspiracy, so any
successive prosecution or attempt to charge two conspiracies would
contravene Blockburger because the elements of the offense cover the
entire course of conduct, no matter how multilayered it might be.
The harder case is where the charge in the second prosecution requires the
government to prove as an element of the case an agreement which was the
subject of a prior prosecution. 8 ' The Supreme Court noted the "conceptual
closeness" of the drug conspiracy statute with the CCE provision, which
requires proof that a defendant acted "in concert" with five or more
persons.' 8 If the agreement is the same in both prosecutions, and if the
agreement is the primary element of both prosecutions, then even after Dixon
a second prosecution should be barred because the elements are incorpo-
rated in the prior proceeding. In United States v. Reed, 8 2 the Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that double jeopardy barred a CCE
prosecution when the defendant had previously been convicted of conspiracy
to import drugs. 83
A number of statutes, especially in the white collar criminal area, can reach
179. See United States v. Maza, 983 F.2d 1004, 1013 (1 1th Cir. 1993) (five factors) (quoting United
States v. Marable, 578 F.2d 151, 154 (5th Cir. 1978)); United States v. Calderone, 982 F.2d 42, 45 (2d.
Cir. 1992) (eight factors) (quoting United States v. Korfant, 771 F.2d 660, 662 (2d Cir. 1985)); United
States v. Elgersma, 979 F.2d 750, 754 (9th Cir. 1992) (five factors) (quoting United States v. Mayo, 646
F.2d 369, 372 (9th Cir. 1981) (per curiam)).
180. This scenario is especially relevant when the government prosecutes a leader of a large
criminal organization who in most cases will not have been directly involved in the actual criminal
activity. Conspiracy charges are appropriate in that circumstance because they permit the government
to attribute the foreseeable acts of all co-conspirators to the leadership of the conspiracy.
181. Jeffers v. United States, 432 U.S. 137, 145 n.] 1 (1977) (plurality opinion). Although the Court
suggested that the drug conspiracy provision, 21 U.S.C. § 846, is a lesser included offense of CCE, the
Court did not squarely decide that prosecution under both provisions is a double jeopardy violation.
Id. at 149. The Court held that there was no constitutional violation because the defendant had asked
to be tried separately on each count. The dissent in Jeffers agreed that § 846 is a lesser included offense
of CCE, and would have found a double jeopardy violation. Id. at 158 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
182. 980 F.2d 1568 (11 th Cir.), cer. denied, 113 S. Ct. 3063 (1993).
183. Id. at 1575-76. The government charged the defendant under 21 U.S.C. § 963 in the second
prosecution, which is similar to 21 U.S.C. § 846, the statute at issue in Jeffers. The Eleventh Circuit
found that the prosecution under § 963, rather than § 846, was only a minor difference that did not
affect the double jeopardy analysis. Id. at 1576 n.3. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has also
held that a conspiracy under § 846 is a lesser-included offense of CCE for the double jeopardy
analysis. United States v. Stricklin, 591 F.2d 1112, 1123 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 963 (1979).
In United States v. Deshaw, 974 F.2d 667 (5th Cir. 1992), a case decided after Felix but before Dixon,
the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the Double Jeopardy Clause does not prohibit a
subsequent prosecution for a RICO conspiracy even when the same conduct formed the basis for
prior drug importation and distribution conspiracy charges on which the defendant was acquitted. Id.
at 671. The circuit court noted that the previous conspiracy prosecutions involved conduct "suffi-
ciently distinct from the conduct needed to support a RICO charge." Id. at 673. The initial
prosecution was for violations of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 963, while the second case involved 18 U.S.C.
§ 1962(d), the RICO conspiracy provision. Congress recently added a Money Laundering conspiracy
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broad, ongoing conduct that does not explicitly subsume other criminal
conduct. For example, the Major Fraud statute reaches conduct by any
person who knowingly executes a scheme to defraud the United States, or
obtain money or property by false pretenses, as a contractor or subcontractor
with the federal government in which the property or services at issue are
worth one million dollars or more.1 84 Similarly, the bank fraud, mail fraud,
and wire fraud statutes prohibit schemes to defraud, or obtaining money by
false pretenses, that are committed against banks and through various
jurisdictional means.1 85 False statements to the government and to financial
institutions are also punishable separately,1 86 and a fraudulent scheme may
involve interstate transportation of stolen property or securities.
1 87
Any fraudulent scheme may entail a number of separate acts designed to
create and consummate the plan to obtain the money or benefits sought,
which could take place over a number of months or years. The different acts
that are part of continuing criminal conduct can be the subject of separate
criminal charges. For example, a scheme to use stolen securities as collateral
for a bank loan issued to fund a construction project could result in a variety
of charges reaching each step in the transaction, multiple charges for the
same acts, and charges under the complex criminal statutes.'8 8 Moreover,
small variations on the basic scenario, such as the source of the funds or the
involvement of insiders in regulated industries, will expand the potential
criminal charges exponentially.' 8 9
provision, 18 U.S.C. § 1956(g), that is distinct from the general conspiracy statute, 18 U.S.C. § 371.
The new Money Laundering provision is similar to the RICO conspiracy section.
184. 18 U.S.C. § 1031 (1988 & Supp. I 1989). Congress enacted the statute in November 1988 as
part of the Major Fraud Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-700, § 2, 102 Stat. 4631.
185. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1988 & Supp. 111990) (Mail Fraud), 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (1988 & Supp. 111990)
(Wire Fraud), 18 U.S.C. § 1344 (1988 & Supp. 111990) (Bank Fraud).
186. See 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990) (false statement to any agency of United States);
18 U.S.C. § 1014 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990) (false statement to financial institution in connection with
any loan or extension of credit); 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(a) (1988) (false statement in connection with
Medicare and Medicaid payments or benefits).
187. See 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (1988 & Supp. II 1990) (interstate transportation of stolen goods or
securities).
188. Possible charges in this simple example include interstate transportation of stolen securities,
18 U.S.C. § 2314; bank fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1344; false statement to a financial institution, 18 U.S.C.
§ 1014; Money Laundering, 18 U.S.C. § 1956; RICO, 18 U.S.C. § 1962; and, given the likelihood that
telephone calls, wire transfers, and letters were used, the mail fraud and wire fraud statutes apply, 18
U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343.
189. For example, if the source of any funds relates to illegal drug transactions, then the CCE
provision may apply. If an officer or director of a bank is involved as a coconspirator in approving the
loan, then additional charges can be brought under the provisions relating to bank bribery, 18 U.S.C.
§ 215 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990); misapplication of bank funds, 18 U.S.C. § 656 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990);
and false entries in the books and records of a financial institution, 18 U.S.C. § 1005 (1988 & Supp. 11
1990). Under federal law, a person who aids and abets a crime may be punished as a principal, so that
other participants in the illegal conduct can also be charged with the insider's crimes. 18 U.S.C. § 2
(1988).
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The question is whether the government could bring successive actions
charging part of the scheme in one prosecution and the overall violation in a
separate action. The fraud statutes can be analogized to the complex criminal
statutes that cover continuing activity, yet the provisions do not require the
government to prove the more elaborate criminal structure underlying a
RICO, CCE, or Money Laundering violation. Those provisions require proof
of separate criminal activity and, for CCE, involvement of five or more
persons in the enterprise, while the fraud statutes can be proven through a
single execution of the scheme to defraud, without proof of violation of any
other statute.1 90 Whether a statute permits successive prosecutions is of
greatest importance at the charging stage, where the government is determin-
ing when to bring its indictment and how broad its charges against a
defendant should be. The government must be concerned with whether
lower courts will interpret Dixon broadly to preclude bringing a second
prosecution, and what unit of conduct the statutes encompass in charging a
criminal violation.
The circuit courts have recently interpreted the bank fraud statute' 91 to
prohibit multiple counts when the conduct is related to a single execution of a
fraudulent scheme. In United States v. Lemons,192 the Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit held that although a scheme to fraudulently obtain a loan
involved a number of different steps, there was "but one performance, one
completion, one execution of that scheme."' 9 3 The circuit court defined the
unit of conduct proscribed by the statute broadly to include various acts
related to the illegal transaction. The court did not, however, define what
constitutes the "execution" of the fraudulent scheme. For example, succes-
sive prosecutions for bank fraud are permissible when different banks are
involved, even though both banks participated in the same underlying
190. Congress recently adopted a Financial Crime Kingpin provision, 18 U.S.C. § 225 (Supp. II
1990), as part of The Comprehensive Thrift and Bank Fraud Prosecution and Taxpayer Recovery Act
of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647, § 2510(a), 104 Stat. 4789, 4863, which is directed against leaders of large
scale criminal enterprises involving gross receipts of $5 million or more. The statute is patterned after
RICO and Money Laundering by requiring proof of a series of violations of other criminal statutes as
an element of the crime. The continuing criminal violations must be committed by at least four
persons acting in concert, which is similar to the CCE requirement.
191. 18 U.S.C. § 1344 provides:
Whoever knowingly executes, or attempts to execute, a scheme or artifice-
(1) to defraud a financial institution; or
(2) to obtain any of the moneys, funds, credits, assets, securities, or other
property owned by, or under the custody or control of, a financial institution, by
means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises;
shall be fined not more than $1,000,000 or imprisoned not more than 30 years, or both.
192. 941 F.2d 309 (5th Cir. 1991).
193. Id. at 318. The scheme involved a multi-million dollar real estate loan, and the defendant was
convicted of eight separate counts of bank fraud involving various transactions leading up to the
disbursement of the loan proceeds. Id. at 312-13.
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transaction.' 94 Similarly, separate checks deposited at a bank as part of a
checkkiting scheme are distinct executions of the fraudulent scheme permit-
ting multiple counts. 95 When only one bank was involved in a single real
estate transaction funded by a single loan, the Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit held in United States v. Lilly' 96 that 29 separate bank fraud counts
could not be brought even though there were 29 different properties involved
in the transaction.
1 97
If the unit of conduct covered by a statute is broadly defined, then after
Dixon it is more likely that other related provisions will be considered a
species of lesser included offenses to the more comprehensive statute. For
example, in United States v. Seda,t 98 the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit held that the statute prohibiting false statements to financial institu-
tions "'99 was "simply a species of bank fraud," and therefore the government
could not bring separate charges under the two statutes. The defendant in
Seda, a bank officer, was charged with four counts each of bank fraud and
194. See United States v. Hollis, 971 F.2d 1441, 1450 (10th Cir. 1992) (same material misrepresen-
tation to different banks permits separate counts under § 1344), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1580 (1993);
United States v. Farmigoni, 934 F.2d 63, 65 (5th Cir. 1991) (separate indictments in Louisiana and
Mississippi involving different banks in same transaction does not violate double jeopardy), cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 1160 (1992).
195. See United States v. Schwartz, 899 F.2d 243, 248 (3d Cir.) (separate sentences upheld for each
deposit of worthless check since each constituted separate violation of § 1344), cert. denied, 498 U.S.
901 (1990); United States v. Poliak, 823 F.2d 371, 372 (9th Cir. 1987) (affirming conviction on ten
counts of bank fraud for ten fraudulent checks), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1029 (1988). The Fifth Circuit
distinguished Poliak on the grounds that a check-kiting scheme was different from the fraudulent loan
transactions because each check represented a separate execution while Lemons' scheme involved
only one fraud conducted through a variety of steps. Lemons, 941 F.2d at 317-18. The weakness in that
analysis, however, is that execution of a check-kiting scheme requires at least two checks being drawn
on different accounts, so that charging each check as a violation is a broad reading of the scope of
§ 1344. See Brian P. Perry, Note, "Execution " of a Scheme to Defraud, An Indictment of The Bank Fraud
Statute: United States v. Lemon, 61 U. CINN. L. REv. 745, 765 (1992) (discussing lack of uniformity
among circuits in applying "execution" language of bank fraud statute).
196. 983 F.2d 300 (1st Cir. 1992).
197. Id. at 304. The government brought the multiple charges based on the submission of false
financial statements in connection with the assignment of 29 different mortgages on condominiums to
a bank to fund a loan on the development. Id. at 302. In United States v. Heath, 970 F.2d 1397 (5th Cir.
1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1643 (1993), the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that even
though two loans were involved from one bank, they were "integrally related," and therefore involved
only a single execution of a bank fraud. Id. at 1402.
198. 978 F.2d 779, 782 (2d Cir. 1992).
199. 18 U.S.C. § 1014 provides:
Whoever knowingly makes any false statements or report, or willfully overvalues any
land, property or security, for the purpose of influencing in any way the action of [any
financial institution], upon any application, advance, discount, purchase, purchase
agreement, repurchase agreement, commitment, or loan, or any change or extension of
any of the same, by renewal, deferment of action or otherwise, or the acceptance,
release, or substitution of security therefor, shall be fined not more than $1,000,000 or
imprisoned not more than 30 years, or both.
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false statements in connection with the submission of fraudulent loan appli-
cations and approval of the loans. The circuit court stated that while the
different statutes passed the Blockburger test because they contain different
elements, strict adherence to that test "is inappropriate . . where one of the
statutes covers a broad range of conduct."2 The court found that there was
no realistic likelihood of violating the more narrow provision, the false
statement statute, without also violating the broader bank fraud statute, and
that the legislative history did not reveal an intent to punish distinct evils in
the different statutes.2"1 Although Seda was decided before Dixon, it shows
how the broader approach to Blockburger can look beyond a mechanistic
comparison of the elements to determine whether a statute incorporates the
elements of another provision to find a double jeopardy violation.
Seda essentially applies Grady's same conduct test to determine if the two
statutes proscribe the same unit of conduct, although the circuit court never
cites Grady. The Second Circuit's conclusion that the false statement provi-
sion is a lesser included offense of bank fraud is based solely on the breadth
of the latter provision. Seda raises the question of whether other broad
criminal fraud statutes, such as the Major Fraud statute,20 2 subsume more
narrow provisions, thereby preventing prosecutors from seeking multiple
counts or bringing successive prosecutions based on the same course of
conduct.20 3 The analysis of the bank fraud provisions is quite different from
that applied to RICO, CCE, and Money Laundering. By spelling out various
offenses that are distinct elements, the complex criminal provisions avoid any
problems under Blockburger because their elements are distinct from the
underlying substantive offense. The bank fraud statute, on the other hand, is
susceptible to a restrictive analysis after Dixon because the courts have found
that it covers a broad unit of conduct that will permit only one prosecution.
200. Seda, 978 F.2d at 781.
201. Id. at 781-82. Oddly, the Second Circuit relied on Whalen as support for its decision, without
ever referring to Garrett or Hunter. Those cases altered the approach in Whalen by finding that when
statutes meet the Blockburger test, there is a presumption in favor of permitting prosecutions under
both provisions. See supra text accompanying note 64.
202. 18 U.S.C. § 1031.
203. The Major Fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1031, is patterned after the bank fraud statute, 18 U.S.C.
§ 1344, so the courts may interpret them similarly in construing the meaning of execution of a scheme
to defraud. See H.R. REP. No. 610, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1988). The legislative history of § 1031,
however, indicates that Congress limited the maximum fine for violations to $10 million to "address a
concern that the government may charge in a single judicial proceeding that a large number of related
incidents are separate violations .... This limitation does not prevent multiple proceedings, for
example, where several independent schemes or artifices have been perpetrated by the same
defendant." S. REP. No. 503, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5969,
5976. This statement may permit a court to find that multiple charges for each act in execution of the
scheme is permissible.
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F. The Confines of Dixon: Sentencing and Successive Prosecutions
for the Same Conduct
The introduction of the defendant's conduct in a second proceeding is not
limited solely to successive criminal prosecutions. In the federal system, the
sentencing of defendants is now governed by the Sentencing Guidelines,
which require courts to consider all of the defendant's "relevant conduct"
and "criminal history" in arriving at the mandated sentence.20 4 Moreover,
courts can enhance a defendant's sentence for obstructing justice in the
investigation or prosecution of the offense, and mitigate a sentence for
accepting responsibility for committing a crime.2 5 The relevant conduct
provision permits a court to include crimes that are not specifically charged if
they are part of the same course of conduct, or a common scheme or plan.20 6
The question then arises whether a defendant can be prosecuted in a
different proceeding for conduct that was incorporated into the determina-
tion of relevant conduct in a prior criminal proceeding, especially where the
additional conduct increases the sentence in the prior proceeding. For
example, if a defendant pleads guilty to one count of theft of property in
interstate commerce, he may have his sentence increased for other thefts that
were not charged by the government but were part of the same scheme. 2 7 If
the thefts occurred in another district, the government could seek a second
indictment charging the other crimes that were considered as relevant
conduct.
The lower courts have split over the issue of whether the use of conduct
outside the offense of conviction under the Sentencing Guidelines consti-
tutes punishment under the Double Jeopardy Clause sufficient to invoke its
204. UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMM'N, GUIDELINES MANUAL, §§ IB1.3, 4 (Nov. 1992) [herein-
after SENTENCING GUIDELINES]. The relevant conduct provision requires the court to consider "all
acts and omissions committed, aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, procured, or willfully
caused by the defendant; and ... in the case of a jointly undertaken criminal activity ... all
reasonably foreseeable acts and omissions of others in furtherance of the jointly undertaken criminal
activity ..... Id. at § 1B1.3(a)(1)(A)-(B). The Sentencing Guidelines prescribe greater punishment
for defendants with prior criminal records because they are considered more culpable. Id. at § 4, intro.
comment.
205. Id. at §§ 3B1.2, 3Ct.1.
206. Id. at § 1B1.3(a)(2).
207. See United States v. Galloway, 976 F.2d 414 (8th Cir. 1992) (en banc) (upholding statutory and
constitutional authority to consider uncharged conduct in determining sentence under Guidelines),
cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1420 (1993). A sentencing court may also consider as relevant conduct any
charges on which a defendant was acquitted. See United States v. Olderbak, 961 F.2d 756, 764-65 (8th
Cir.) (holding that facts underlying acquittal may be considered for sentencing purposes when facts
appear reliable), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 422 (1992); United States v. Rodriguez-Gonzalez, 899 F.2d
177, 181 (2d Cir.) (reaffirming validity of sentence enhancement on the basis of acquitted conduct),
cert. denied, 498 U.S. 844 (1990); United States v. Wright, 873 F.2d 437, 441 (1st Cir. 1989)(noting that
the court considered multiple drug counts in imposing sentence, even though Count I had been
dismissed).
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protections. In United States v. Carey,20 8 the Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit held that enhancing a defendant's sentence for failure to
appear at sentencing "did not constitute punishment for her failure to
appear," and therefore a subsequent prosecution for willfully failing to
appear did not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause.20 9 Similarly, in United
States v. Mack,21° the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit permitted a
subsequent failure-to-appear prosecution to proceed, stating that "[a]n
enhanced sentence because of a prior conviction is no more double jeopardy
than is a consideration of other relevant conduct, including the likelihood of
a subsequent conviction., 21 The rationale for permitting a second prosecu-
tion for conduct considered at sentencing is that the conduct is used as a
consideration in evaluating the character of the defendant and the crime, but
is not a separate punishment.21 2
The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, relying on the Grady same
conduct test, took the opposite approach in United States v. Koonce,21 3 a case
decided before Dixon. The defendant was convicted in South Dakota for
distributing 443 grams of methamphetamine, and at sentencing the district
judge added 963 grams that had been seized from the defendant's Utah home
to the calculation of the amount for the Guidelines sentence, effectively
increasing the sentencing range by 48-58 months. The defendant was then
convicted in Utah of possession with intent to distribute the 963 grams and
possession of a firearm. Prior to the Utah trial, he filed a challenge to the
prosecution on double jeopardy grounds, which the Tenth Circuit rejected as
not ripe for review because there had not been a successive prosecution for
the same conduct at that point.21 4 Upon conviction, the Tenth Circuit
reversed the drug conviction as violative of the Double Jeopardy Clause. The
court first held that the South Dakota sentencing constituted punishment,
which brought that phase of prosecution under the multiple punishments
prong of the Double Jeopardy Clause. Next, the Tenth Circuit found that
208. 943 F.2d 44 (11th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1676 (1992).
209. Id. at 46.
210. 938 F.2d 678 (6th Cir. 1991).
211. Id. at 681. The circuit court rejected the defendant's argument that Grady prohibited the
second prosecution because "[i]f Appellant is correct, then any consideration is a second punishment
and therefore violative of the Double Jeopardy Clause." Id. It is not clear why the circuit court even
reached the double jeopardy issue because the sentence imposed was within the Guidelines range for
the offense of conviction without regard to any other conduct. The sentence in the original
prosecution was not enhanced because of the failure to appear, so the defendant had not been
punished or subjected to any additional jeopardy.
212. See United States v. Garcia, 919 F.2d 881, 886 (3d Cir. 1990) (other bad acts used "merely to
evaluate" character of defendant and crime); United States v. Prusan, 780 F. Supp. 1431, 1439
(S.D.N.Y. 1991) ("A sentence enhancement is distinct from a sentence and does not trigger double
jeopardy concerns."), rev'd on other grounds, 967 F.2d 57 (2d Cir. 1992).
213. 945 F.2d 1145 (10th Cir. 1992) cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1705 (1992) [hereinafterKoonce I].
214. United States v. Koonce, 885 F.2d 720 (10th Cir. 1989) [hereinafter Koonce I].
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there was no congressional intent to permit double punishment by using the
conduct in determining the sentence under the Guidelines and then in a
successive prosecution.2 5 The enhancement of a defendant's sentence consti-
tuted punishment for the conduct, and therefore any subsequent prosecution
for that conduct would violate Grady.
Even though Grady has been overruled, the analysis is arguably the same
under the lesser-included offense analysis adopted in Dixon. The trial court's
consideration of the defendant's conduct in increasing the sentence is similar
to introducing a separate underlying criminal violation to prove a violation of
a judicial order in a contempt proceeding. In each instance, the elements of
the separate substantive offense may be fully incorporated into the proceed-
ing, and a subsequent prosecution would involve proving the same elements,
thereby resembling a successive prosecution for a lesser-included offense.
Cases permitting the court to increase a sentence under the Guidelines
and then allowing a subsequent prosecution on the exact same conduct on
the rationale that an "enhancement" is distinct from "punishment" for
double jeopardy purposes elevate form over substance. The Sentencing
Guidelines require courts to impose sentences within a very specific range,
and an enhancement will generally increase the sentence. Asserting that an
increased term of imprisonment is only an enhancement but not punishment
for the conduct is fallacious because the Guidelines do not give a court
discretion to depart from the sentence outside of the prescribed range.2" 6
It is questionable whether the second prosecution should even be permit-
ted to proceed when a defendant has been punished for conduct outside the
offense of conviction under the Sentencing Guidelines, as the Tenth Circuit
permitted in Koonce I. The circuit court was technically correct that, under a
strict application of Blockburger, the Utah prosecution did not involve the
same elements as that prosecuted in South Dakota. A conviction in the
second case, however, could not result in the imposition of any sentence
under the Double Jeopardy Clause because the defendant had already been
215. Koonce II, 945 F.2d at 1151. The circuit court relied heavily on the Guidelines provision
providing for grouping of closely related counts, which requires that "[aill counts involving substan-
tially the same harm shall be grouped together into a single group." SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra
note 204, at § 3D1.2. When counts are grouped together, the Guidelines provide for aggregating the
total amount of loss or illegal substance involved, and applying the appropriate sentence level based
on that amount. Id. at § 3D1.3(b). The circuit court found it illogical that a greater punishment could
be imposed by bringing separate prosecutions in which the government could aggregate the amount of
drugs twice while the grouping provision would provide a shorter sentence if there were only one
prosecution. "The protections against prosecutorial charge manipulation strongly suggests that
Congress did not intend such a result." Koonce H, 945 F.2d at 1152.
216. See United States v. McCormick, 798 F. Supp. 203, 209 (D. Vt. 1992), aft'd, 992 F.2d 437 (2d
Cir. 1993) (rejecting government's argument that 13-level increase under the Guidelines was
"enhancement" instead of "punishment").
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punished. In United States v. McCormick,2 1 7 the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit prohibited a second prosecution on certain counts from
proceeding, rather than considering the double jeopardy question after a
second conviction, when the conduct at issue had been considered by another
court in determining the amount of loss under the Guidelines for fixing the
applicable offense level.2"' It is counterintuitive to force a defendant to
defend against a second prosecution when a court is constitutionally barred
from imposing a second sentence for the conduct.2"9
The problem with finding a double jeopardy violation where conduct is
used to increase a sentence that is later the subject of a separate prosecution
is that the Sentencing Guidelines require the court to also consider a
defendant's prior criminal history in determining the appropriate offense
level, with increased sentences for defendants who are repeat offenders.220
The Supreme Court stated in Gryger v. Burke22 that an increased sentence as
a habitual criminal "is not to be viewed as either a new jeopardy or additional
penalty for the earlier crimes. ' '2 22 The Guidelines also increase the punish-
ment for defendants who are "organizer[s] or leader[s]" of criminal activity
involving five or more people,223 which is similar to the CCE provision
requiring proof that five or more persons were involved in the illegal drug
activity. If a sentence is increased under the Guidelines because of the
defendant's leadership role, could that preclude a subsequent criminal
prosecution for CCE?
A better approach to understanding the double jeopardy implications of
217. 992 F.2d 437 (2d Cir. 1993).
218. Id. at 439. The defendant was convicted of bank fraud in Connecticut, and the district court
considered $4 million of losses charged in a bank fraud indictment in Vermont. The circuit court held
that "Congress did not intend to allow additional punishment for conduct that was used to enhance a
defendant's offense level." Id. at 440.
219. In McCormick, Judge Mahoney argued in dissent that the second prosecution should be
permitted to proceed because the government may want to seek restitution from the defendant for the
transactions that were considered by the federal district court in Connecticut in sentencing. Id. at 444
(Mahoney, J., dissenting). The problem with that analysis is that the restitution statute, 18 U.S.C.
§ 3663(a), requires that an order of restitution be "in addition to" any other penalty, if the conviction
is for a felony. If double jeopardy prohibits the imposition of a sentence for conduct considered in
enhancing a sentence in a prior proceeding, then there is no criminal penalty on which the restitution
order could be based. Moreover, for violations of the federal securities laws for insider trading, the
Securities and Exchange Commission regularly seeks disgorgement of profits in insider trading
actions. See McLucas et al., supra note 134, at 92 (remedial tools available to Commission include
disgorgement with pre-judgment interest, which is sought "in the vast majority of cases").
220. See SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 204, at § 4A1.1-.2 (criminal history category
determined by each prior sentence; prior sentences in unrelated cases are counted separately);
§ 3B1.1 (increasing offense level depending on defendant's role in criminal activity).
221. 334 U.S. 728 (1948).
222. Id. at 732; see United States v. Thomas, 930 F.2d 12, 13-14 (8th Cir. 1991) (circuit courts
approve enhanced sentence based on higher criminal history category as not violating double
jeopardy).
223. SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 204, at § 3B1.1(a).
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using conduct to increase a sentence under the Sentencing Guidelines is to
focus on Dixon's lesser-included offense analysis to determine whether the
government is proving the same elements that were introduced in the
sentencing to convict the defendant in the subsequent prosecution. This
requires courts to distinguish between conduct that relates to the quality of
the first offense, and conduct that is outside the offense of conviction but is
considered to be related to the sentenced criminal activity. If the conduct
concerns the quality of the offense, then its use in sentencing does not raise
double jeopardy concerns because it will not involve proof of the elements
that constitutes a separate offense. For example, the defendant's prior
convictions affect the culpability determination that a person who is a repeat
or habitual offender is guilty of a greater offense because of his knowledge of
the conduct's criminality and abuse of societal norms through repeated
violations. Similarly, one's managerial role in the offense should result in a
greater or lesser punishment because it demonstrates the degree of harm
intended in the criminal activity.
An enhanced sentence for a leadership role should not affect a subsequent
prosecution involving proof of that managerial role because the sentencing
court did not consider all of the elements of the second offense of conviction,
only the magnitude of the defendant's blameworthiness. If the subsequent
prosecution is permissible under Dixon as a separate offense, then it should
involve proof of other elements beyond that introduced in the prior sentenc-
ing of the defendant based on the position as a "leader or organizer." This
approach is also consistent with the Court's analysis in Dowling, which
permits the use of evidence introduced in a prior prosecution that was not
proof of an element of the crime charged.
If the court enhances the defendant's sentence for conduct external to the
criminal activity that is the subject of the charges used in sentencing, then the
unit of conduct in the prosecution has been expanded to include the elements
of those additional acts. For example, the defendant's sentence must be
increased two levels when the court finds that the defendant's testimony at
trial constituted perjury.224 That enhancement should prohibit a separate
prosecution for perjury based on the trial testimony because the elements
that would be proved in a second prosecution were incorporated in the
sentencing for which an additional punishment has been imposed. 225 This
approach to determining the unit of conduct means that there is no distinc-
tion between the successive prosecution and multiple punishment protec-
224. Id. at § 3C1.1.
225. This analysis should also prevent a second trial for the conduct used to enhance the sentence,
an approach sanctioned by the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in Koonce I. See supra, note 214
and accompanying text (discussing Koonce I).
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tions of the Double Jeopardy Clause because the increased sentence is the
equivalent of a separate prosecution.
When the government is intent on punishing conduct that is extrinsic to the
criminal acts for which sentencing is pending, then this approach suggests
that under double jeopardy, prosecutors should choose between seeking an
enhanced sentence or bringing a separate indictment. A new criminal action
will require the government to prove the charges beyond a reasonable doubt,
a higher burden than the preponderance of evidence standard required
under the Sentencing Guidelines for the court to enhance a sentence.22 6 A
distinct conviction, however, will generally result in greater punishment than
a sentence enhancement, especially because the prior conviction will affect
the determination of the criminal history under the Sentencing Guidelines.
Under Dixon, either an enhancement or separate prosecution is permissible,
but this analysis shows that seeking both would violate the protections of the
Double Jeopardy Clause.
IV. UNITED STATES V. HALPER: THE ILLOGIC OF STRETCHING DOUBLE
JEOPARDY TO CIVIL SANCTIONS
The issue of whether the imposition of multiple punishments is constitution-
ally permissible was generally considered of lesser importance than determin-
ing the scope of the protection from successive prosecutions because the
principle value vindicated by the Double Jeopardy Clause was presumed to
be protecting the finality of verdicts from being reopened in a second
prosecution."' The multiple punishment question usually arose only in a
single prosecution, and the Blockburger test, as refined by the Supreme Court,
was considered sufficient to protect a defendant from a double jeopardy
violation 28 Grady and Dixon, however, show that the distinction between
the successive prosecution and multiple punishment prongs is blurred be-
cause the double jeopardy analysis frequently turns on the underlying facts
rather than which label is attached to the procedural posture of the case. The
origin of the same elements test is in cases raising the multiple punishment
226. See, e.g., United States v. Guerra, 888 F.2d 247, 251 (2d Cir. 1989) (requiring government to
prove new charges beyond a reasonable doubt), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1090 (1990).
227. See Thomas, Elegant Theory, supra note 29, at 838 ("The functional triviality of a double
jeopardy limitation on punishment argues in favor of finality as the primary double jeopardy value.");
Thomas, Successive Prosecutions, supra note 32, at 342 ("[Tlhe prohibition of multiple convictions in a
single trial is a less fundamental protection."); George C. Thomas, III, A Unified Theory of Multiple
Punishment, 47 U. Prrr. L. REV. 1, 7 n.22 (1985) (multiple punishment prong is an "adjunct" to
successive prosecution prong); Eli J. Richardson, Note, Matching Tests for Double Jeopardy Violations
with Constitutional Interests, 45 VAND. L. REV. 273, 277 (1991) ("[P]rohibition against multiple
punishments serves fewer important purposes than the prohibition against multiple prosecutions.").
228. See Burton, supra note 59, at 806 (multiple punishment prong limited to whether court can
impose cumulative punishment in one proceeding).
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issue, but it has now superseded the broader same conduct test for analyzing
successive prosecutions.
In United States v. Halper,"9 the Supreme Court altered the analysis of the
multiple punishment prong by holding that a civil penalty assessed in a
separate proceeding after a criminal conviction violated the Double Jeopardy
Clause. A constitutional protection for which courts employed a form of
analysis that had been the sole province of statutory construction under
Blockburger was transformed by Halper into a broader, case-by-case approach
when the government brings successive criminal and civil actions. The
multiple punishment prong of the Double Jeopardy Clause, which had once
been a poor stepchild of double jeopardy jurisprudence, may have the
greatest effect on altering the relationship between the government and
defendants as the government expands the use of multiple statutory provi-
sions in parallel civil and criminal actions to seek both remedial and punitive
sanctions.
The Double Jeopardy Clause did not reach beyond criminal cases until
Halper. The Court disrupted the simple regime in multiple punishment cases
when it held that a penalty in a civil action amounted to a criminal punish-
ment in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause when the defendant had
already been convicted for the same conduct.2 30 Although the Court tried to
limit its holding by asserting that its decision applied only to the rare case,
23
'
the decision effectively requires lower courts to make a particularized
assessment of whether a civil penalty reaches such a degree of severity that it
crosses the threshold of criminal punishment in every case in which the
government brings successive actions.232 Yet Halper provides no guidance on
how to determine when the limit has been breached such that a defendant
can invoke the protections of double jeopardy.
The procedural posture of Halper is similar to the successive prosecution
scenario, but the Court found that the only double jeopardy protection
available was under the multiple punishment prong. Where the government
seeks a penalty in a succeeding action, it has to guess whether it may traverse
the limit of Halper if the court imposes a civil sanction that amounts to an
impermissible criminal penalty. This is especially true after Austin v. United
States,233 when the Court held that for Eighth Amendment purposes a civil
asset forfeiture always constitutes punishment.
229. 490 U.S. 435 (1989).
230. 490 U.S. at 448-449 ("We therefore hold that under the Double Jeopardy Clause a defendant
who already has been punished in a criminal prosecution may not be subjected to an additional civil
sanction to the extent that the second sanction may not fairly be characterized as remedial, but only as
a deterrent or retribution.").
231. Id.
232. See Eads, supra note 11, at 931 (Halper injects judicial activism into the process of distinguish-
ing civil remedies from criminal sanctions).
233. 113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993).
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Because the Halper analysis depends on reaching a vague conclusion of
when a sanction passes from civil to criminal, Blockburger plays no significant
role in this area, which means that whatever simplicity the multiple punish-
ment protection of double jeopardy may have had is lost. Moreover, ignoring
the status of the second action led the Court to adopt a rule in Halper that, if
taken to its logical conclusion, could severely disrupt government enforce-
ment efforts and radically alter the foundations of the judicial system by
completely blurring the line between civil and criminal actions when the
government is a party. Halper's analysis could require the government to
forego seeking civil sanctions in separate actions, and raises the question of
whether other constitutional criminal protections beyond the Double Jeop-
ardy Clause apply to actions in which quantitatively severe penalties can be
assessed against defendants.
The vagueness of Halper's double jeopardy analysis, and the potential
breadth of its rationale, shows that the Court sought to reach a just result
without adequately assessing the effect its decision would have on future
cases. A better understanding of Halper results if, in much the same way the
Court used Felix to limit its holding in Grady, Halper is not read expansively,
but instead is understood to apply to a narrow range of cases involving
fixed-penalties for each violation without regard to the severity of the
conduct. Although lower courts have generally taken a restrictive approach
to Halper,234 the decision provides defendants with a means to raise the
double jeopardy issue at a pretrial stage to delay the proceedings.235
A. The Civil-Criminal Distinction for Applying Double Jeopardy Before Halper
The designation of a case as criminal or civil can be crucial to determining
the process by which the government introduces evidence and the jury
reaches a verdict. Some of the most familiar constitutional safeguards, such
as the right to counsel,236 confrontation of witnesses, 37 and the privilege not
234. See, e.g., United States v. Cullen, 979 F.2d 992, 994 (4th Cir. 1992) (in rem forfeitures are civil
actions because they remove harmful instrumentalities from defendants); United States v. Furlett,
974 F.2d 839, 844 (7th Cir. 1992) (Commodities Futures Trading Commission civil penalty and bar
from trading are civil); Manocchio v. Kusserow, 961 F.2d 1539, 1541 (lth Cir. 1992) (exclusion from
Medicare program for five years is civil sanction); see infra, text accompanying notes 292-316
(reviewing interpretations of scope of Halper).
235. See United States v. Cunningham, 757 F. Supp. 840, 848 (S.D. Ohio) (double jeopardy claim
under Halper is frivolous and trial ordered to commence immediately), aft'd, 943 F.2d 53 (6th Cir.
1991).
236. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have the Assistance of
Counsel." U.S. CONST. amend VI.
237. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the
witnesses against him." Id.
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to testify,238 are applicable only in criminal cases.2 39 More importantly, the
burden of proof in a criminal case rests entirely on the government, which
must prove the criminal violations beyond a reasonable doubt.24 ° In a civil
action, the plaintiff need only prove the case by a preponderance of the
evidence, and the broader discovery rules permit wide-ranging requests for
information that the government could not seek from a criminal defendant,
including depositions and interrogatories directed to the ,opposing parties.
Moreover, the Supreme Court has held that an assertion of the Fifth
Amendment Privilege against self-incrimination may be used against the
party asserting it in a civil action.241
Prior to Halper, the Supreme Court had consistently rejected double
jeopardy claims in civil actions brought by the government that sought
sanctions for violations that were the subject of prior criminal proceedings.242
In Helvering v. Mitchell,243 the government brought a civil action to collect a
tax deficiency plus a fifty percent statutory penalty after the defendant's
acquittal for tax evasion. The Court stated, "[t]hat acquittal on a criminal
charge is not a bar to a civil action by the Government, remedial in its nature,
arising out of the same facts on which the criminal proceeding was based has
long been settled." '44 The key to the Court's analysis was whether Congress
intended the proceeding to be criminal, because "[u]nless this sanction was
intended as punishment, so that the proceeding was essentially criminal, the
double jeopardy clause provided for the defendant in criminal prosecutions is
not applicable." '245
238. "No person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." U.S.
CONST. amend V.
239. See Cheh, supra note 20, at 1329 (certain protections are expressly limited to criminal cases,
and others have been interpreted by the Supreme Court to apply only to criminal prosecutions). The
Supreme Court has recognized that the privilege against self-incrimination and the exclusionary rule
apply in civil forfeiture proceedings. See United States v. United States Coin & Currency, 401 U.S.
715, 721-22 (1971) (self-incrimination privilege attaches in some forfeiture proceedings); One 1958
Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 696 (1965) (exclusionary rule applies in civil forfeiture
case).
240. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (due process requires government to prove every
element of crime beyond a reasonable doubt).
241. See Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 318 (1976) ("[T]he Fifth Amendment does not forbid
adverse inferences against parties in civil actions when they refuse to testify in response to probative
evidence offered against them.").
242. In the nineteenth century, the Court had held that double jeopardy precluded a forfeiture
action after an acquittal, Coffey v. United States, 116 U.S. 436 (1886), but that decision was overruled
in United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 366 (1984). See Glickman, supra
note 11, at 1256 (for 50 years prior to Halper, Court refused to find a sanction sought in a civil
proceeding to violate double jeopardy).
243. 303 U.S. 391 (1938).
244. Id. at 397. The defendant challenged the penalty on double jeopardy grounds, but the Court
found that the sanctions were remedial in nature, and therefore the action was civil. Id. at 401-02.
245. Id. at 399. The Court stated that the question whether a sanction is criminal is "one of
statutory construction." Id.
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In United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess,246 the Court held that a qui tam
action seeking a recovery from contractors that engaged in bid rigging for
which the defendants had been criminally convicted did not violate the
Double Jeopardy Clause. A qui tam action is a civil action brought by a
private plaintiff on behalf of the government that seeks damages for viola-
tions involving, inter alia, fraud against the government; if successful, the
plaintiff receives a portion of any award to the government.2" 7 The Court
followed the statutory construction approach of Mitchell to determine whether
the statute was criminal or civil, and found that the "remedy [did] not lose the
quality of a civil action because more than the precise amount" of damages
was awarded. 248 Even though the effect of the award constituted punishment,
the Court did not find that the underlying statute was converted into a
241 h
criminal provision that required double jeopardy protection. Similarly, the
Court held in Rex Trailer Co., Inc. v. United States250 that a statutory penalty
can be analogized to a liquidated damages clause, and therefore the action is
civil even though the damages from the violation "may be difficult or
impossible to ascertain .... 251
The Court adopted a two-part test for determining whether a statute
imposes a civil or criminal penalty in United States v. Ward. 52 The first part of
the test is "whether Congress, in establishing the penalizing mechanism,
indicated either expressly or impliedly a preference for one label or the
other." '253 Second, if Congress denotes a penalty as civil, there must be "the
clearest proof" that the statutory scheme is so punitive in purpose or effect
that it negates the designation as civil.
25 4
The Court applied the Ward test, which concerned application of the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, to a civil forfeiture provi-
sion in United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms2 55 to determine whether
246. 317 U.S. 537 (1943).
247. 31 U.S.C. § 3730 (1988). The False Claims Act requires that the citizen notify the Department
of Justice of the suit, and the government can take over prosecution of the action. Id. at § 3730(b)(2)-(4).
See Cheh, supra note 20, at 1347 (qui tam statutes make citizens into bounty hunters who are
handsomely paid out of the offender's pocket).
248. Hess, 317 U.S. at 550. The judgment was for $315,000, which included $203,000 in double
damages and a statutory penalty of $112,000, based on $2,000 for each of 56 separate violations. Id.
249. Id. at 551-52.
250. 350 U.S. 148 (1956).
251. Id. at 153. The statute at issue was almost identical to that in Hess, and the Court followed the
statutory construction analysis suggested in Mitchell in considering whether the underlying statute was
civil or criminal.
252. 448 U.S. 242 (1980).
253. Id. at 248. The issue was whether a defendant in a civil money penalty case had the Fifth
Amendment Privilege against self-incrimination.
254. Id. at 248-49. The Court held that the nature of the penalties did not overcome the
Congressional designation of the statute as civil.
255. 465 U.S. 354 (1984).
1993]
AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW
double jeopardy precluded forfeiture of the property after the defendant was
acquitted of criminal charges related to possession of the weapons without a
license. The Court succinctly stated the guiding principle, that "[u]nless the
forfeiture sanction was intended as punishment, so that the proceeding is
essentially criminal in character, the Double Jeopardy Clause is not
applicable., 256 The Court found that Congress intended the forfeiture
actions to be civil, and the provision is not so punitive as to overcome the
Congressional intent because the forfeiture permitted by the statute is not
coextensive with the criminal penalty.
257
The thrust of the Supreme Court's analysis of the double jeopardy implica-
tions of civil sanctions was twofold: First, the question was one of statutory
analysis. Second, the Court had not found a civil penalty to constitute a
criminal proceeding, despite the fact that fixed penalties were assessed, such
as Mitchell's fifty percent assessment or Hess's statutory penalty for each
violation, or when the government could not identify the value of the damage
suffered from the defendant's violations, as in Rex Trailer.258
The form of the analysis was consistent with the Blockburger test. Mitchell is
complementary to Blockburger because both tests require a court to ascertain
the underlying purpose of the statute at issue, in one instance to determine
whether Congress intended to create a civil remedy and in the other whether
Congress authorized separate criminal punishments. If a court determined
that a sanction was criminal rather than civil, it may also have to determine
whether the statutes passed the Blockburger test if the government could
argue that Congress authorized multiple punishments.
B. Halper Pushes a Civil Peg in a Criminal Hole
In what should have been an easy case, the Supreme Court ignored
precedents stretching back over fifty years, including a decision directly on
point that considered the same statutory sanction, to hold that a penalty
imposed in a civil action after a criminal conviction constituted a violation of
the Double Jeopardy Clause.259 In Halper, the defendant was convicted of
filing false claims and mail fraud in connection with submitting sixty-five
256. Id. at 362. The defendant also argued that collateral estoppel precluded the government from
bringing the forfeiture action, but the Court held "that the difference in the relative burdens of proof
in the criminal and civil actions precludes application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel." Id.
257. id. at 365-66; see also One Lot Emerald Cut Stones and One Ring v. United States, 409 U.S.
232, 237 (1972) (forfeiture actions are civil in nature despite "their comparative severity").
258. See Eads, supra note 11, at 943 (until Halper, severity of penalty did not transform action from
civil to criminal); Glickman, supra note 11, at 1261 ("Court's decisions implied.., that a civil penalty
could not be held to be criminal without first holding that the statute itself was criminal in purpose or
effect.").
259. See Eads, supra note 11, at 951 (Halper ignored past precedents); Glickman, supra note 11, at
1251 (Halper departs "from fifty years of double jeopardy jurisprudence").
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fraudulent reimbursement claims under the Medicare program, resulting in a
total overpayment of $585. Halper was sentenced to two years in prison and
a $5,000 fine.260 Following the conviction, the government brought a civil
False Claims Act action against Halper based on the same sixty-five claims,
seeking the statutory penalty of $130,000 ($2,000 per false claim) plus double
damages for the loss sustained.
The district court found that assessing the full civil penalty would violate
the double jeopardy prohibition, and entered a judgment on behalf of the
government for $1,170 (the double damages) and the costs of the civil
action.2 6' The Supreme Court agreed that the double jeopardy protection
may apply to civil actions. Although the statute at issue was the same that
Hess held was civil and not criminal for double jeopardy purposes, the
Supreme Court in Halper adopted a new form of analysis for civil penalties
that appear to be "so extreme and so divorced from the Government's
damages and expenses as to constitute punishment. ,
262
As an initial matter, the Court rejected the argument that the sole inquiry
in determining whether a civil sanction rises to the level of criminal punish-
ment is a matter of statutory construction.26 3 The Court then distinguished
the precedents applying the statutory construction test, although its analysis
of those decisions is highly questionable. Halper rejected Mitchell as control-
ling, labelling that decision's significance as "tangential" on the ground that
since the defendant had been acquitted, the Court had not determined
whether a civil sanction could be "punishment" for double jeopardy pur-
poses.264 Mitchell's analysis, however, did not depend on the defendant's
prior acquittal, and that opinion categorically supports the proposition that
the nature of the underlying statute determines the applicability of the
Double Jeopardy Clause. 65
Halper then distinguished Hess and Rex Trailer on the basis that the civil
sanction in those cases approximated the loss caused by the violation, a
situation markedly different from "the stark situation presently before us
where the recovery is exponentially greater than the amount of the fraud,
and... is also many times the amount of the Government's total lOss.266
260. Halper, 490 U.S. at 437. The defendant submitted bills for medical services that paid $12 per
claim, when in fact he was entitled only to $3 per claim for the services actually rendered. Id. at 437
n.2.
261. id. at 439-40.
262. id. at 442.
263. Id. at 441.
264. Id. at 442-43.
265. Eads, supra note 11, at 948-49. Professor Eads argues that the Court's attempt to distinguish
the precedents is "unpersuasive." Id. at 948.
266. 490 U.S. at 445. The Court noted that in Hess the "actual costs to the government roughly
equaled the damages recovered ...... ld.; see also Eads, supra note 11, at 950-51 (criticizing Court's
analysis of Hess and Rex Trailer).
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The Court further rejected the two-part test enunciated in Ward for differen-
tiating civil and criminal statutes as ill-suited to addressing the "humane
interests" safeguarded by the Double Jeopardy Clause.267
Once the Court had shelved the line of precedent that had evolved into a
fairly straightforward bright-line test for determining the application of
double jeopardy to civil sanctions, it pronounced its new formula: "Simply
put, a civil as well as a criminal sanction constitutes punishment when the
sanction as applied in the individual case serves the goals of punishment." '26 8
According to the Court, punishment serves the goals of retribution and
deterrence. Thus, a civil penalty that does not serve solely a remedial purpose
must advance either retributive or deterrent purposes, requiring that the
sanction be characterized as criminal. Having announced its holding, the
Court sought to constrict the potential breadth of its position by noting that
the analysis of whether a sanction is remedial or punitive "will not be an exact
pursuit," and compensatory sanctions "involve[] an element of rough
justice." '269
Halper immediately recognized specific exceptions to its broad holding,
stating that liquidated damages and fixed-penalty-plus-double-damages pro-
visions will generally serve the remedial purpose of making the government
whole. Not surprisingly, those two types of civil sanctions were at issue in Rex
Trailer and Hess, respectively, so the Court saved itself from deciding whether
those decisions were overruled by Halper's new analysis. It then went a step
further to mitigate the effect of the opinion, proclaiming that its rule was for
the "rare case," and that the Court did not consider the holding either "far
reaching or disruptive of the Government's need to combat fraud. 270 What
Halper gives with one hand, it tries to take with the other.
The Court, whose decision was unanimous, was obviously displeased with
the government's attempt to extract an additional penalty from the defen-
dant through the use of the civil remedy. Halper is similar to Grady in that
both decisions announced broad rules that limit the government's power to
seek added penalties, and in both the Court is highly critical of the prosecuto-
rial tactics employed in bringing a second action based on the same facts. In
Grady, the Court emphasized the breakdown in communication among
members of the district attorney's office, while Halper returned repeatedly to
a comparison of the comparatively minuscule gain from the illegal conduct
with the imposition of severe criminal and civil penalties.
In both decisions, the Court was able to place the blame on the -govern-
ment for the result because the Court concluded that prosecutors sought
267. Halper, 490 U.S. at 447.
268, Id. at 448.
269. Id. at 449.
270. Id. at 449-50.
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more than they deserved. Moreover, the analysis in Halper and Grady showed
the Court tempering its conclusions by emphasizing the limited nature of its
holdings and discussing what its new rules did not encompass, despite the
broad language used in the holding. In Grady, the Court stated that it
eschewed the same transaction test in favor of the more limited same conduct
test, although the difference between the two tests was obscure.27 ' Halper
asserts that its holding is for the rare case and is only a "rule... of reason.2 72
Halper's analysis can be attacked on a number of different grounds. The
conclusion that a civil sanction rises to the level of punishment under the
Double Jeopardy Clause if it involves any deterrent or retributive purpose is
unnecessarily restrictive in its interpretation of the legitimate goals of civil
remedies.273 Indeed, this position is open to broad interpretation by the
lower courts and creates enormous uncertainty about whether any civil
sanction may be invalid if it is sought after a criminal conviction.274
The Court also stated that its rule does not apply where the defendant has
not been punished in a criminal action. Under this reasoning, if a prior
criminal prosecution results in an acquittal then there is no bar to a punitive
civil action. Yet, the Double Jeopardy Clause has never been limited to
successful criminal prosecutions. Halper has been criticized for giving greater
protection to convicted criminals than to those found not guilty of a criminal
violation.275
Halper's flawed analysis is grounded in the Court's initial decision to treat
the case as raising only the multiple punishment prong of the Double
Jeopardy Clause.276 Once the Court limited itself to a multiple punishment
analysis, its preferred result of finding a double jeopardy violation required it
271. Compare Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508, 521 (1990) (same conduct test "is not an 'actual
evidence' or 'same evidence' test") with id. at 539 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (principle adopted by
majority requires that charges arising from single transaction be tried in single proceeding).
272. 490 U.S. at 449.
273. See Eads, supra note 11, at 975 (Halper is a "dramatic break from precedent and traditional
understanding of deterrence," and it was once considered "axiomatic" that civil sanctions had a
legitimate purpose to deter violative conduct). Eads criticizes the Court's use of precedent to support
the conclusion that civil sanctions can only serve remedial purposes as a series of "small steps with
little thought as to destination." Id. at 976.
274. See id. at 977 (consequences of Halper may call into question a number of government civil
penalty statutes); Glickman, supra note 11, at 1265-66 (if Halper interpreted broadly, decision will
"create havoc, potentially disrupting all parallel proceedings"); Philip S. Khinda, Note, Undesired
Results Under Halper and Grady: Double Jeopardy Bars on Criminal RICO Actions Against Civilly-
Sanctioned Defendants, 25 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 117, 139 (1991) (although holding is qualified,
potential effects of Halper leave prosecutors on uncertain ground in parallel civil and criminal
proceedings).
275. See Lynn C. Hall, Note, Crossing the Line Between Rough Remedial Justice and Prohibited
Punishment: Civil Penalty Violates the Double Jeopardy Clause-United States v. Halper, 65 WASH. L.
REV. 437, 438 (1990) (Halper does not go far enough and double jeopardy principles demand equal
protection for all defendants).
276. 490 U.S. at 440.
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to make dubious distinctions about precedents and adopt a definition of
punishment that does violence to the usual understanding of civil regulatory
regimes that impose sanctions for violations.
The procedural posture of Halper fits most conveniently into the successive
prosecution prong of double jeopardy, and that is in fact what the govern-
ment sought: a second sanction for the same violations. If the Court treated
the False Claims Act action as a second prosecution, it would run afoul of
Blockburger because the government sought summary judgment by incorpo-
rating the elements of the prior criminal conviction. There is no question that
the same underlying substantive provision is the basis for the civil action.
Grady's form of analysis would reach the identical result because the
government is prosecuting the same conduct in the second proceeding.
Using either successive prosecution analysis would have made irrelevant
the Court's broad definition of what constitutes punishment, and the corre-
spondingly narrow interpretation of the constitutionally permissible pur-
poses of civil sanctions. A successive prosecution violation depends on the
underlying conduct or comparison of the elements of the violations, neither
of which the Court considered in Halper. Moreover, the successive prosecu-
tion protection under the Double Jeopardy Clause applies to cases brought
after convictions or acquittals, so a defendant's protection would not depend
on the outcome of the prior action.
The successive prosecution analysis, however, presents much greater
problems than it could solve because the constitutional protection applies
only when the second proceeding is designated as criminal. Under Ward's
test, the Court would have to find overwhelming evidence that Congress had
created a punitive scheme that is clearly criminal. This would also require
overruling the holding in Hess that the False Claims Act is civil. Halper's focus
on the severity of the punishment, rather than the underlying nature of the
statute as civil or criminal, as the basis for finding a double jeopardy violation
would mean that the entire action was criminal. If the application of a
particular penalty can make an action criminal, then all of the Constitution's
procedural protections for criminal defendants, such as the right to indict-
ment by a grand jury, right to counsel, and right to a speedy trial, would
automatically apply to the successive proceeding. Such an approach would
revolutionize the structure of civil and criminal law by greatly expanding the
potential application of constitutional criminal rights, depending on the
severity of the penalty. The civil regulatory mechanism would be affected if
the civil action were deemed criminal because certain independent regula-
tory agencies, such as the Securities and Exchange Commission, are not
authorized to pursue criminal actions.
277
277. See Glickman, supra note 11, at 1276 (if treble damage insider trading penalties are held to be
criminal punishment, SEC would be precluded from seeking criminal sanction, which is outside its
jurisdiction).
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Such an approach would also severely limit the ease and convenience with
which the government seeks civil sanctions, by way of summary judgment or
ex parte proceedings, in which the prior criminal conviction or probable
cause that a crime has been committed is the key item of proof. Once an
action is designated criminal, the government must prove guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt, and the prior conviction cannot govern a subsequent
criminal proceeding. 278 The viability of parallel actions would be highly
questionable if the Court had followed the logic of the procedural posture of
Halper and applied its analysis of civil sanctions under the successive prosecu-
tion prong of the Double Jeopardy Clause.
C. What the Court Writes with One Hand, It Smudges with the Other
Once it is apparent that the multiple punishment prong of the Double
Jeopardy Clause is the only reasonable alternative available if the Court
wants to find a constitutional violation, the rationale for the Halper analysis,
and its flaws, becomes apparent.
A prior criminal conviction is the trigger for the double jeopardy protec-
tion. Thus, the Court could not provide comparable protection for the
acquitted defendant because the multiple punishment prong only reaches
those who have been convicted. Any attempt to somehow stretch the
protection afforded by double jeopardy would pull the Court into the
successive prosecution analysis, which it had to avoid.
While a prior conviction is the precondition for invoking a Halper analysis,
the severity of the criminal penalty does not affect the analysis of whether the
civil sanction rises to the level of punishment under the Double Jeopardy
Clause. The sole issue in a Halper analysis is whether the civil sanction is
"rationally related to the goal of making the government whole., 27 9 This
standard forces lower courts to perform a case-by-case analysis to determine
whether the penalty in the second action exceeds the limit of a remedial
purpose and crosses into deterrence and retribution, thus invoking double
jeopardy.280
The problem with Halper's approach is that it looks solely to the fact of a
prior prosecution without giving any guidance on whether differences be-
278. See United States v. Harnage, 976 F.2d 633, 635 (11th Cir. 1992) (government may not use
collateral estoppel in a criminal prosecution to prevent a defendant from relitigating an issue decided
by another court).
279. Halper, 490 U.S. at 451. The Court noted that the rational relationship requirement would
have been met in Halper if there were only one or two false claims, and that "[ilt is only when a sizable
number of false claims is present that, as a practical matter, the issue of double jeopardy may arise."
Id. at 451 n.12.
280. See Glickman, supra note 11, at 1264 (Court adopts a "functionalist case-by-case approach" to
determine when civil penalty constitutes punishment under double jeopardy).
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tween the criminal and civil action will alleviate double jeopardy concerns. In
successive prosecution cases, Dixon's application of the Blockburger test
requires courts to distinguish the elements of the offenses and determine
whether the second provision is a species of a lesser-included offense. As a
multiple punishment analysis, Halper would seemingly require only an appli-
cation of Blockburger to determine whether the criminal and civil actions
involve the same elements. That approach, however, means that if the
criminal prosecution involved a crime that was not a necessary element of the
civil case, then the civil sanction could be imposed.
For example, in an insider trading case, it is usually possible to prove wire
fraud in connection with the purchase or sale of the securities. Such wire
fraud is not an element of a civil insider trading sanctions case.2 81 Similarly,
the government could seek both a criminal conviction against a bank officer
for making false entries in the records of a financial institution and a civil
penalty for bank fraud involving the same transactions.282
Halper did not have to address the issue of the degree to which the civil and
criminal actions must be congruent to trigger the double jeopardy protection
because the government sought summary judgment based solely on the prior
prosecution. 283 The use of a form of double jeopardy analysis which did not
fit the facts presented required the Court to adopt a new rule that gives lower
courts the power to determine whether a particular civil sanction rises to the
level of a double jeopardy violation, without reference to whether the
elements of the two provisions are the same. Halper's analysis is closer to
Grady's same conduct test because it relies on the identity of the underlying
conduct to find a double jeopardy violation. Upon adopting its rule, however,
the Court sought to control the breadth of its holding by announcing that
Halper does not affect cases in which there has been no prior criminal
conviction, in which the government seeks both criminal and civil penalties in
a single proceeding, or in private civil actions.284
281. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (Supp. II1 1991) (wire fraud requires proof, inter alia, of interstate
transmission by means of wire, radio or television of any writings, signs, signals, pictures, or sounds for
the purpose of executing the scheme) with 15 U.S.C. § 78u-1 (1988) (authorizing civil penalty up to
three times the gain or loss avoided for insider trading).
282. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 1005 (Supp. 111 1991) (requiring proof, inter alia, that a bank officer or
director made a false entry in any book, report or statement of the bank with intent to deceive any
officer of the bank or financial regulator) with 12 U.S.C. § 1833a (Supp. IV 1992) (authorizing civil
penalty for violations of a variety of criminal banking laws).
283. Courts have made it clear that the order of the civil and criminal action does not affect the
double jeopardy analysis. See United States v. Furlett, 974 F.2d 839, 843 n.2 (7th Cir. 1992) (although
the civil penalty came before the criminal case, no need to limit Halper based on timing of the
actions); United States v. Sanchez-Escareno, 950 F.2d 193, 200 (5th Cir. 1991) (order of proceedings
does not affect analysis under Halper), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 123 (1992). United States v. Bizzeli, 921
F.2d 263, 267 (10th Cir. 1990) (criminal prosecution not banned by prior civil penalties deemed by
court to be remedial in nature).
284. Halper, 490 U.S. at 450-51.
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The Court attributes greater significance to what remains unaffected by its
decision than in fact exists. The government does not bring civil and criminal
actions together because there is no mechanism for doing so, especially
where an independent regulatory agency has only civil authority and the
Department of Justice is the sole criminal prosecuting authority.28 5 More-
over, there are numerous procedural problems to bringing joint actions,
principally with regard to the appropriate burden of proof and coordinating
the different discovery rules. 86 In addition, the Court noted that it did not
decide whether its new rule covers qui tam actions, in which a citizen sues on
behalf of the government and receives a portion of the award. If the Halper
rule does cover such actions, then its reach expands even further.287
The Court's exercise in trying to limit the scope of its holding rings hollow.
The case-by-case approach the Court endorses engenders uncertainty in an
area of law tfiat works best with bright-line rules. A better approach to
double jeopardy would permit the parties to make a reasonably assured
determination of whether a second action could be brought in order to
protect the Double Jeopardy Clause's principal value of verdict finality,
which limits unnecessary expenditures of prosecutorial resources that may
inequitably force defendants to attempt to vindicate themselves in successive
proceedings.
The case-by-case approach endorsed in Halper also undermines Congress's
power to determine whether to adopt parallel civil and criminal mechanisms
to enforce the law. In Missouri v. Hunter, a multiple punishment case, the
Court stated, "Legislatures, not courts, prescribe the scope of punishments."2 8
Yet Halper rejects the deference due to the legislature by permitting a court
to find a congressionally authorized penalty to be criminal in nature regard-
285. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d) (1988 & Supp. III 1991) (SEC authorized to bring civil actions and
to transmit evidence concerning questionable acts or practices to the Attorney General who may then
institute criminal proceedings). Even when the Department of Justice is authorized to bring both civil
and criminal actions, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e) generally prohibits a prosecutor from
sharing grand jury information with another government attorney responsible for a civil action. FED.
R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(2). See United States v. Sells Engineering, Inc., 463 U.S. 418, 435 (1983) (government
attorney with only civil duties may not receive grand jury materials without judicial authorization).
Congress recently authorized the disclosure of grand jury information concerning banking law
violations to attorneys for the government for use in civil penalty actions under section 951 of the
Financial Institution Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 and in civil forfeiture actions
under section 981 of title 18, United States Code. 18 U.S.C. § 3322 (Supp. III 1991).
286. See Eads, supra note 11, at 978 (no modern authority for combining criminal and civil trials,
and "its practical application is fraught with problems"); Glickman, supra note 11, at 1271 (Court
offered no advice on how to implement combined trial).
287. See Cheh, supra note 20, at 1380 n.285 (structure of qui tam action under False Claims Act
lends support to view that it is a government action subject to double jeopardy protection).
288. 459 U.S. 359, 368 (1983).
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less of the legislative intent to adopt it as a civil remedy.289 This approach
conflicts with the application of the Blockburger test, and shows that Halper's
use of the multiple punishment approach, while theoretically justifiable given
the alternative of finding that a civil penalty is a criminal prosecution, cannot
be squared even with the fundamental precedents in that area.
Halper's new rule that civil penalties may rise to the level of criminal
punishments for constitutional purposes is not limited to the "rare case,"
despite the Supreme Court's protestations otherwise. The breadth of the rule
permits defendants to argue that virtually any subsequent action, civil or
criminal, violates double jeopardy. Moreover, this issue can be raised at the
pretrial stage and is immediately appealable, creating the possibility of
delaying the proceeding pending appellate review.29
The incentive to raise the double jeopardy issue, and the uncertainty
created by Halper, has forced the lower courts to consider the scope of the
Double Jeopardy Clause as applied to a variety of different statutory civil
provisions. The question the courts have not considered is whether the
Halper analysis is even necessary. A different approach under the Eighth
Amendment would protect defendants from being subjected to unduly harsh
sanctions in successive actions without triggering the problems generated by
Halper's extension of double jeopardy protection to civil penalties.
D. The Limits of Halper
While the rule announced in Halper is broad, being potentially applicable
to any parallel proceeding in which the government seeks criminal and civil
sanctions, the Supreme Court tried to limit the scope of the holding by stating
that its conclusion was only for the "rare case," and stressing that it was not
working any significant restructuring of double jeopardy jurisprudence.
Halper's breadth gives defendants an incentive to raise double jeopardy
issues whenever possible because a finding that the sanction in a prior
proceeding was criminal can prevent the government from even pursuing the
subsequent action. The problem the lower courts face is determining whether
to apply Halper's analysis expansively to different types of civil remedies
beyond fixed-penalty provisions, or to follow the Supreme Court's admoni-
289. See Cheh, supra note 20 at 1364 (legislature decides which conduct and which proceedings are
criminal).
290. See United States v. Abney, 431 U.S. 651, 662-63 (1977) (authorizing appellate jurisdiction to
review denial of motion to dismiss based on double jeopardy grounds). Trial is postponed when the
court finds the double jeopardy claim is not frivolous. United States v. Leppo, 634 F.2d 101, 105 (3d
Cir. 1980). In addition, appellate review of the defendant's motion is de novo. United States v.
Furlett, 974 F.2d 839, 842 (7th Cir. 1992).
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tion that its ruling was more an exception to the general acknowledgement
that civil sanctions do not implicate the Double Jeopardy Clause.29 '
The initial question is whether Halper even applies to the case, or whether
the civil sanction is only remedial. Courts have not limited their analysis to
those cases that mimic the procedural posture of Halper, in which the
criminal case preceded the civil matter, instead holding that the order of the
civil and criminal cases is irrelevant.29 2 Thus, Halper's analysis is frequently
invoked when the civil action takes place first, and defendants have been
creative in arguing that civil remedies rise to the level of criminal punish-
ment, trying to stretch Halper's rationale to preclude any successive criminal
action after a regulatory sanction. For example, in United States v. Woods,293
the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that placing a bank into
receivership did not constitute punishment of the bank's sole owner under
the Double Jeopardy Clause.294 In United States v. Walker,295 the defendant
argued that the government should be required to assess the full amount of a
statutorily authorized civil penalty, $5,000, rather than a $500 penalty, for his
failure to disclose that he was carrying a small amount of marijuana while
entering the country; the defendant was later indicted for possession and
importation of marijuana. 296 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
rejected the attempt to increase the civil penalty to create a Halper issue, and
held that the $500 civil penalty bore a rational relationship to the government's
costs of administering the customs system.29
7
The lower courts have generally held that sanctions involving exclusion
from government programs or from industries subject to pervasive regula-
tion, which do not involve a direct monetary penalty, are remedial penalties
that do not rise to the level of punishment under Halper. In United States v.
Furlett, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that the Commodi-
ties Futures Trading Commission's order excluding the defendant from
trading in any futures market was a remedial measure commensurate with his
291. See Glickman, supra note 11, at 1267 (Halper can be read narrowly or expansively, making the
scope of its holding uncertain).
292. See Furlett, 974 F.2d at 843 n.2 (civil sanctions imposed by Commodities Futures Trading
Commission before criminal indictment); United States v. Bizzell, 921 F.2d 263, 267 (10th Cir. 1990)
(civil sanctions imposed by HUD before criminal indictment).
293. 949 F.2d 175 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1562 (1992).
294. Id. at 177. The defendant brought a pretrial motion to dismiss the indictment, and an
interlocutory appeal after its denial.
295. 940 F.2d 442 (9th Cir. 1991).
296. Id. at 443. Under 19 U.S.C. § 1459, the Customs Service is authorized to impose a $5,000 civil
penalty for failing to disclose the existence and nature of all articles brought through customs. Under
Customs Service Directive 4400-11 (October 18, 1989), the penalty is automatically mitigated to $500.
Id.
297. Id. at 443-44; see also United States v. Reed, 937 F.2d 575, 577 (11 th Cir. 1991) (suspension of
postal employee under union arbitration agreement is not punishment under Halper precluding later
indictment for same conduct).
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wrongdoing.298 In Manocchio v. Kusserow, 99 the Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit held that Halper does not apply to the defendant's exclusion
for five years from participating in Medicare programs after pleading guilty
to submitting a fraudulent Medicare claim for $62.40.300
Similarly, courts have characterized recoveries by the government as a
form of restitution that is pure recompense for the government's loss, and
therefore not a punishment under Halper. In United States v. Moore,30 1 the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia rejected the
argument that Halper prohibited the government from recovering over
$100,000 that the defendant secretly received from a government contractor,
for which the defendant had already been criminally convicted.30 2 In Brown
Construction Trades, Inc. v. United States,30 3 the United States Claims Court
held that prohibiting a contractor from recovering a claim under a contract
won through bribery of a government official was not punitive but only
overcame the harm done to the integrity of the procurement process.30 4
Along the same line, in SEC v. Bilzerian,3 °5 the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia held that an order sought by the SEC requiring
the defendant to disgorge profits of over $33 million realized in violation of
the federal securities laws was remedial, not punitive, because its goal was
"to prevent the unjust enrichment of the wrongdoer by depriving him of
ill-gotten gains., 3
0 6
Only when a civil penalty rises to the level of punishment, that is, when it
serves the purposes of deterrence and retribution rather than being reme-
dial, must the court determine whether the assessment is disproportionate to
the harm and the government's costs. When the civil sanction involves a
direct monetary penalty, the lower courts have generally been flexible in
298. 974 F.2d at 844. The civil regulatory action and the criminal indictment concerned the illegal
allocation of profitable commodities trades to the defendants and placement of unprofitable trades in
the accounts of customers. Id. at 841. The CFTC also imposed a $75,000 fine, which the circuit court
found to be a rough approximation of the government's costs of investigating and prosecuting the civil
action. Id. at 843-44.
299. 961 F.2d 1539 (11th Cir. 1992).
300. Id. at 1542. The circuit court stated that the intent of the exclusionary period was to protect
present and future Medicare beneficiaries, and therefore the sanction was remedial, not punitive. Id.;
see also Greene v. Sullivan, 731 F. Supp. 838, 840 (E.D. Tenn. 1990) (five year exclusion from
Medicare program does not violate Halper because statute remedial to protect integrity of program,
beneficiaries, and public confidence in Medicare).
301. 765 F. Supp. 1251 (E.D. Va. 1991), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 1992 U.S. App. Lexis 20952
(4th Cir. 1992).
302. Id. at 1256-57. The district court stated that the government action was purely remedial as a
forfeiture of the defendant's illicit gain. Id.
303. 23 Cl. Ct. 214 (1991).
304. Id. at 216.
305. 814 F. Supp. 116 (D.D.C. 1993).
306. Id. at 120.
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accepting the government's position that the penalty generally equates the
loss caused by the defendant's actions and the government's costs of investi-
gating and prosecuting the matter.30 7
In Furlett, the Seventh Circuit upheld a $75,000 civil penalty as remedial
even though the government's evidence did not specify the exact costs of the
investigation but only provided a general approximation of the amount of
time spent investigating the entire fraudulent scheme. 30 8 In United States v.
Walker,3"9 the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit stretched the "rough
justice" concept to the limit when the government did not submit any specific
evidence of its costs, but the circuit court took judicial notice of the financial
burden of "maintaining check points and administering the customs
system."3 ' Similarly, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit stated in
United States v. WRW Corp.31' that the district court's failure to consider the
government's expenses "does not alter the objective conclusion ... that the
penalty assessed is rationally related to the goal of making the Government
whole."3"2 In United States v. Fliegler,31 3 the United Stated District Court for
the Eastern District of New York took a stricter approach, finding that the
government's accounting for approximately $110,000 of costs in both civil and
criminal prosecutions supported a civil penalty under the False Claims Act,
the same statute at issue in Halper, of $115,000, even though the statute
authorized a penalty up to $230,000. 3 11
Halper's analysis can be misleading because courts may assume that the
assessment of any direct civil penalty that has a specific monetary value
307. Although there may be an order directing payment of a civil monetary penalty, courts have
held that Halper does not apply until the penalty has actually been paid. In United States v.
Sanchez-Escareno, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit stated that there had not been any
punishment that would preclude a subsequent criminal prosecution where the defendants signed
promissory notes to pay a civil penalty but the government had not started to collect on the notes. 950
F.2d 193, 202 (5th Cir. 1991),cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 123 (1992). In United States v. Park, the same court
held that Halper did not apply to a criminal prosecution where the Customs Service retained currency
it had seized, but had not instituted forfeiture proceedings to deprive the defendant of the right to the
funds. 947 F.2d 130, 135 (5th Cir. 1991). In dicta, the circuit court stated that if the funds were
forfeited, then a Halper analysis would be appropriate for the criminal prosecution. Id.
308. 974 F.2d at 844.
309. 940 F.2d 442 (9th Cir. 1991).
310. 940 F.2d at 444. Judge Noonan expressed distaste with the majority's cost analysis, arguing
that a pro rata share of the government's overall costs provides "an essentially arbitrary choice as to
the system whose expense is shared and a virtual blank check as to the amount it can assess." Id.
(Noonan, J., dissenting).
311. 986 F.2d 138 (6th Cir. 1993).
312. Id. at 142. The corporate defendant had been assessed a $90,350 fine for violations of the
Federal Mine Safety and Health Act, and the company's three sole shareholders had been convicted
of criminal violations of the same statute. After the company was liquidated, the government sought
to collect the civil penalties from the shareholders, who argued that the penalties violated their
double jeopardy rights. Id. at 140.
313. 756 F. Supp. 688 (E.D.N.Y. 1990).
314. Id. at 697.
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automatically requires the government to prove that it is not disproportion-
ate to the harm caused by the violation and the government's costs of
investigating and prosecuting the action. For example, in In re Kurth Ranch,31 5
the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit leaped to the conclusion that
assessment of a $208,105 tax by Montana on harvested marijuana constituted
double jeopardy when those liable for the tax had been convicted of posses-
sion and sale of the illegal drugs. The circuit court held that Halper requires a
determination of the relationship between the sanction imposed by the state
and damages suffered by the government without analyzing whether or not
the tax assessment was even a civil penalty, or whether it was remedial.31 6
Instead, the court placed the burden on the state to adduce evidence to
demonstrate that the tax assessment was proportional to its costs. The court
short-circuited the Halper analysis by assuming that a tax assessment is a civil
sanction, and further, that requiring a person to pay over $200,000 was so
grossly disproportionate that it required a finding that the tax was punitive.
Halper makes clear that the first step in the analysis is to determine
whether the penalty is remedial, and then whether it is so disproportionate
that it rises to the level of punishment under the Double Jeopardy Clause.
The defendants' convictions were for violation of the drug laws, while the tax
related to their decision to harvest and sell the marijuana for a profit. There
is a strong argument that even if the tax, as opposed to a penalty related to a
violation of the tax laws, can be labelled a civil sanction, under Blockburger
the tax assessment involves proof of completely different elements than the
drug violations for which the defendants were convicted, overcoming any
multiple punishment concerns. More importantly, Kurth Ranch shows the
trap Halper creates by permitting courts to assume that the gross amount of a
civil sanction necessarily connotes disproportionality and a double jeopardy
violation. The Ninth Circuit never considers the purpose of the tax statute
but only looks to the effect of a sizeable assessment, apparently adopting the
position that ostensibly large monetary sanctions undermine any remedial
purpose to a civil sanction.
E. Austin v. United States: Is "Punishment"Always the Same?
A superficial approach to the Halper analysis that looks only to the amount
of the penalty to determine whether there is a constitutional violation can be
mistakenly applied in cases considering whether the Double Jeopardy Clause
prohibits successive criminal prosecutions and civil asset forfeiture proceed-
ings. In recent years, asset forfeiture has become one of the primary weapons
315. 986 F.2d 1308 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. granted sub nom., Montana Dep't of Revenue v. Kurth
Ranch, 62 U.S.L.W. 3208 (Oct. 5, 1993).
316. Id. at 1311.
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employed to supplement criminal prosecutions, with cases often involving
parallel civil and criminal proceedings arising out of the same underlying
transactions. The types of violations that can form the basis of an asset
forfeiture action have also expanded, and the principal ones are for drug
violations, 3 8 RICO, Money Laundering, banking violations, 3'9 and the sexual
exploitation of children. 32" Asset forfeiture actions can be brought either
civilly or criminally, with the key distinction being that civil actions are in rem
proceedings initiated against the property itself, while criminal forfeiture is
in personam. 3 1 The government may seek the forfeiture of the instrumentali-
ties of a crime, contraband, and most importantly the profits from the illegal
activity and all assets traceable to the illicit proceeds. 322 Among the items
that may be seized for drug violations is all real property used to facilitate the
criminal violations, even if only a part of the property was used to commit the
offense.323
The appeal of civil asset forfeiture is that the government need only show
317. The value of property disposed by the federal government from 1985 through 1991 totaled
over $2.2 billion, with $644.3 million in fiscal year 1991. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 1991 ANNUAL
REPORT OF THE A-17ORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES 61 (1992); see Marc B. Stahl, Asset
Forfeiture, Burdens of Proof and the War on Drugs, 83 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 275, 276 (1992)
(discussing rapid expansion of asset forfeitures as part of war on drugs).
318. 21 U.S.C. §§ 853 (1988) (criminal forfeiture), 881 (1988) (civil forfeiture).
319. 18 U.S.C. §§ 981 (1988) (civil forfeiture), 982 (1988) (criminal forfeiture). These provisions
cover asset forfeiture for RICO, Money Laundering, and banking violations.
320. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2253 (1988) (criminal forfeiture), 2254 (1988) (civil forfeiture).
321. Michael F. Zeldin & Roger G. Weiner, Innocent Third Parties and Their Rights in Forfeiture
Proceedings, 28 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 843, 844 (1991). Because the criminal forfeiture is an adjunct of the
prosecution and against the defendant individually, the government can seek forfeiture of substituted
assets if it cannot trace the proceeds of the criminal violations or they are transferred by the
defendant, a remedy that is not available in a civil forfeiture action. See 21 U.S.C. § 853(p) (1988)
(forfeiture of substituted property); 18 U.S.C. § 982(b)(1)(B) (Supp. 1992) (adopting 21 U.S.C. §
853(p) for criminal forfeitures). Commentators have criticized the distinction between civil in rem
proceedings and criminal in personam proceedings as being based on an outmoded legal fiction that
the actual property, divorced from the owner, is the party to the litigation and therefore the claimant
is accorded lesser protection than a criminal defendant. See Stahl, supra note 317, at 295 (historical
analysis does not explain lesser protection afforded claimants under § 881); Tamara R. Piety, Note,
Scorched Earth: How the Expansion of Civil Forfeiture Has Laid Waste to Due Process, 45 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 911, 919 (1991) (historical tradition of in rem proceedings is weak justification for proceeding
that violates fundamental principle of presumption of innocence).
322. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C) (Supp. 1992) ("[a]ny property, real or personal, which
constitutes or is derived from proceeds traceable to a violation").
323. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) (1988) provides:
(7) All real property, including any right, title, and interest (including any leasehold
interest) in the whole of any lot or tract of land and any appurtenances or improve-
ments, which is used, or intended to be used, in any manner or part, to commit, or to
facilitate the commission of, a violation of this subchapter punishable by more than one
year's imprisonment, except that no property shall be forfeited under this paragraph, to
the extent of an interest of an owner, by reason of any act or omission established by that
owner to have been committed or omitted without the knowledge or consent of that
owner.
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probable cause that the property to be forfeited facilitated the commission of
the underlying crime.324 Once the court finds probable cause, the burden
shifts to any claimant to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the
property was not used in a crime, or that the person is an innocent owner.325
Moreover, the civil proceeding is not dependent on the institution of criminal
charges,3 26 and the criminal adjudication does not preclude the civil forfei-
ture.
The breadth of the asset forfeiture provisions empower the government to
claim highly valuable property-such as cars, boats, and real estate-whose
worth may far exceed the amount of loss caused by the underlying illegal
activity, or the value of the item that is the subject of such activity. This is
especially true in drug cases, in which the classic example is the Supreme
Court's decision in Calero-Toledo v. Peason Yacht Leasing Co. 327 which
upheld the forfeiture of a yacht on which a single marijuana cigarette was
found. 328 The value of the property seized, as compared to the underlying
criminal violations, makes civil asset forfeiture cases especially susceptible to
See United States v. Certain Real Property, Commonly Known as 6250 Ledge Road, Egg Harbor, WI,
943 F.2d 721, 726 (7th Cir. 1991) (§ 881(a)(7) clearly contemplates forfeiture of entire tract of land
based on violations on a portion of tract) (quoting United States v. Reynolds, 856 F.2d 675, 676 (4th
Cir. 1988)); United States v. One 107.9 Acre Parcel of Land in Warren Township, 898 F.2d 396, 400
(3d Cir. 1990) (civil forfeiture under § 881(a)(7) embraces entire tract even if only part used in
violation). Under the relation-back provisions of the forfeiture laws, 18 U.S.C. § 981(f)(1988) and 21
U.S.C. § 881(h) (1988), title in the property subject to the forfeiture action vests in the government at
the time of the criminal violation, and subsequent transfers to third parties are void.
324. 21 U.S.C. § 881 (d) (1988), which also furnishes the relevant procedures under 18 U.S.C. § 981
(d) (1988), provides that the procedures under the customs laws can govern the case. The customs
provision, 19 U.S.C. § 1615 (1988), provides that in forfeiture actions the burden of proof shifts to the
claimant upon a finding of probable cause. See Stahl, supra note 317, at 284-85 (reviewing burden of
proof under § 881). Although the probable cause standard is low, the government does not always
succeed in meeting that minimal threshold to seize property prior to the completion of a criminal
prosecution. See United States v. $31,990 in U.S. Currency, 982 F.2d 851, 856 (2d Cir. 1993) (grounds
for seizure must rise above the level of mere suspicion, and possession of sizeable amount of cash is
not per se evidence of illegal drug activity).
325. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) and (7) (1988) provide that property shall not be forfeited if the criminal
acts were committed without the knowledge or consent of the owner. An owner is not limited to bona
fide purchasers for value, and includes innocent owners who receive the property through a gift or
other transfer. United States v. A Parcel of Land, Building, Appurtenances and Improvements known
as 92 Buena Vista Avenue, 113 S. Ct. 1126, 1127 (1993). The innocent owner still bears the burden of
proof of lack of knowledge or consent. United States v. Sixty Acres in Etowah County, 930 F.2d 857,
859 (1 1th Cir. 1991); United States v. One Lot of U.S. Currency, 927 F.2d 30, 32 (1st Cir. 1991).
326. See Damon Garett Saltzburg, Note, Real Property Forfeitures as a Weapon in the Government's
War on Drugs:A Failure to Protect Innocent Ownership Rights, 72 B.U. L. REV. 217, 224 (1992) (civil and
criminal proceedings are distinct).
327. 416 U.S. 663 (1974).
328. Id. at 690. The company that owned of the yacht had leased it to the person who carried the
marijuana and did not learn of the forfeiture until it tried to recover the vessel when the lessee
defaulted on the payments. Id. at 668.
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Halper challenges when the government brings parallel civil and criminal
actions because the amounts involved can be so large.
As is often true with Supreme Court decisions announcing imprecise rules,
the circuit courts split on whether civil asset forfeitures are even subject to
the Halper analysis. In United States v. Cullen, the Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit rejected a defendant's argument that the civil forfeiture of a
building worth approximately $300,000 violated double jeopardy when he
had already been prosecuted for distributing a controlled substance from the
premises. 32 9 The procedural posture of Cullen is typical of many parallel
forfeiture proceedings, in which the government brings an in rem action
shortly after an indictment, and after the conviction seeks summary judgment
on its complaint to seize the property based on the conviction.130 The Fourth
Circuit contrasted the statute in Halper, which provided for compensation for
violations, with asset forfeiture, which serves a remedial purpose by removing
a harmful instrumentality from a criminal. The court held, "[t]he Double
Jeopardy Clause does not apply to civil forfeitures where the property itself
has been an instrument of criminal activity. ' ' 33' Similarly, the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held in United States v. McCaslin332 that
"Halper has no application to the very ancient practice by which instrumen-
talities of a crime may be declared forfeit to the government. 333
In United States v. Certain Real Property and Premises Known as 38 Whalers
Cove Drive,334 the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reached the
opposite conclusion, holding that, "We read Halper to apply to civil forfei-
tures. Forfeitures that are overwhelmingly disproportionate to the value of
the offense must be classified as punishment unless the forfeitures are shown
to serve articulated, legitimate civil purposes." '335 The circuit court stated
that when the item forfeited is not an instrumentality of the crime, and its
value is "overwhelmingly disproportionate" to the value of the drugs involved
in the offense, then there is a rebuttable presumption that the forfeiture is
punitive under Halper.336
329. 979 F.2d 992, 995 (4th Cir. 1992).
330. Id. at 993-94. The defendant, a doctor, pleaded nolo contendere to distributing a controlled
substance outside the scope of a legitimate medical practice. Id.
331. Id. at 995. Halper does not apply to a forfeiture of property acquired with the proceeds of
illegal activity. United States v. Borromeo, 995 F.2d 23, 27 (4th Cir. 1993).
332. 959 F.2d 786 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 382 (1992).
333. Id. at 788. The government first succeeded in seizing the property because it was used to grow
marijuana, and then indicted the defendant, who moved to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds. Id. at
787; see also United States v. Certain Real Property 566 Hendrickson Blvd., 986 F.2d 990, 998 (6th Cir.
1993) (remedial, nonpunitive purposes of the civil asset forfeiture provision "extremely strong").
334. 954 F.2d 29 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 55 (1992).
335. Id. at 35.
336. Id. at 36. The property was the defendant's equity interest in a condominium from which he
sold a small amount of cocaine. Id. at 32. The court found that the forfeiture was more than 300 times
19931
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In Austin v. United States,33 7 the Court resolved the circuit split in consider-
ing whether the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause338 applied to
an in rem civil asset forfeiture of real property on which a drug sale took
place, but was otherwise unrelated to the violation. 339 Austin had pleaded
guilty in state court to possession of cocaine with intent to distribute after
selling two grams of cocaine that he had retrieved from his mobile home and
sold at the auto body shop that he owned. 34" The federal government then
brought an in rem civil action seeking the forfeiture of the mobile home and
body shop, and the district court granted summary judgment based on the
state court conviction. 34 ' The government brought its action under 21 U.S.C.
§ 881(a)(4) and (a)(7), the drug forfeiture provisions, which permit the
forfeiture of conveyances and real property used to facilitate a violation of
the narcotics laws.342
The Court began with the principle that the Eighth Amendment limits
"the government's power to punish., 343 It rejected the Government's argu-
ment that the Excessive Fines Clause does not reach civil proceedings by
noting that the analysis was not governed by the label applied to the action.344
The Court then quoted its description in Halper that civil sanctions which
serve more than remedial purposes are punishments in order to support its
position that even when a forfeiture serves both remedial and punitive
purposes it may violate the Eighth Amendment.34 5
In order to determine whether in rem forfeitures constitute punishment,
the Court had to look beyond the legal fiction that only the property (in rem)
greater than the value of the drugs involved in the criminal violation, and as a matter of law met the
overwhelming disproportionality threshold to create the rebuttable presumption of being punitive. Id.
at 37.
The odd thing about 38 Whalers Cove Drive is that the circuit court found no constitutional violation
because, under the dual sovereignty doctrine, when separate governments prosecute a defendant for
the same offense there is no double jeopardy violation. See Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 89 (1985)
(reaffirming dual sovereignty doctrine). The defendant had pleaded guilty to the drug offense in New
York state court, and the federal government brought the asset forfeiture action, so the defendant
was not punished twice by the same government. Given that result, the Second Circuit's entire Halper
analysis was dicta because it was completely unnecessary to application of the dual sovereignty
doctrine to the double jeopardy claim.
337. 113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993).
338. "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual
punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend VIII.
339. Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2803.
340. Id.
341. Id. Because the criminal proceeding was in state court and the forfeiture action in federal
court, there was no double jeopardy claim under the dual sovereignty doctrine. See supra note 336
(discussing dual sovereignty doctrine).
342. See supra note 323 (quoting § 881(a)(7)).
343. Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2805.
344. Id. at 2804.
345. Id. at 2806 (quoting Halper, 490 U.S. at 447).
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and not its owner (in personam) is before the court. The traditional reserva-
tion of the innocent owner defense in both common law and more modern
statutory forfeiture proceedings supports the proposition that asset forfei-
ture "serves, at least in part, to punish the owner. ' 34 6 The Court then
reviewed the conveyance and real property forfeitures authorized by
§ 881(a)(4) and (a)(7), finding that they are inextricably tied to proof of the
owner's culpability as a means to exact punishment through the forfeiture.347
It rejected the argument that this type of forfeiture was solely remedial,
noting that "the dramatic variations" between the underlying violation and
the forfeited properties undercut any claim of compensation or rough justice
for the government. 348 The Court then quoted the same passage from Halper
that it had cited earlier in the opinion to support the proposition that the
deterrent or retributive aspects of the forfeiture raised it to the level of
punishment under the Excessive Fines Clause.349
Much as it did in Halper, the Court in Austin made broad assertions about
the punitive aspects of asset forfeiture that are belied by later statements in
the opinion. The Court concluded at one point that "forfeiture generally and
statutory in rem forfeiture in particular historically have been understood, at
least in part, as punishment., 351 Standing alone, that would imply that any
civil asset forfeiture action is subject to the Eighth Amendment. But the
Court then acknowledged its holding in United States v. One Assortment of 89
Firearms,35t that the forfeiture of illegal weapons was remedial. The
provisions at issue in Austin go far beyond the forfeiture of illicit materials or
contraband to reach items that facilitate the illegal transactions.
It is unlikely that a forfeiture action to reach the proceeds of drug
transactions, as permitted under § 881(a)(6),353 would be found to be
346. Id. at 2810. The Court reviewed the history of common law forfeitures to find that the use of
the guilty property fiction of in rem jurisdiction had not overcome the claims of a truly innocent owner
to resist the government action. Justice Scalia protested the analysis of the culpability of the owner as
essential to the conclusion that forfeitures constitute punishment as unnecessarily eliminating the
common law distinction between in rem and in personam actions. Id. at 2814 (Scalia, J., concurring).
347. Id. at 2810-11. The legislative history confirmed the punitive nature of the provisions because
they were directed toward removing the means of conducting the drug trade and deterring future
violations.
348. Id. at 2812.
349. Id. "[A] civil sanction that cannot fairly be said solely to serve a remedial purpose, but rather
can only be explained as also serving either retributive or deterrent purposes, is punishment, as we
have come to understand the term." Halper, 490 U.S. at 448 (emphasis added).
350. 113 S. Ct. at 2810.
351. 465 U.S. 354, 364 (1984).
352. 113 S. Ct. at 2811.
353. § 881(a)(6) provides as follows:
Forfeitures
(a) Subject property. The following shall be subject to forfeiture to the United
States and no property right shall exist in them:
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punitive because the money is a substitute for the narcotics, a byproduct of
the violation.354 That same provision, however, also allows the forfeiture of
any funds intended to be used to facilitate an illegal transaction, which is
arguably similar to the forfeitures in Austin. The Court failed to differentiate
between the different types of items that are subject to the forfeiture laws,
instead using a broad brush in asserting that in rem forfeitures are histori-
cally considered to be punishment. 5
The Court's reliance on Halper to support its analysis of what constitutes
punishment raises a troubling question as to the future application of Austin's
holding outside the Eighth Amendment. Both cases are premised on a
determination of whether the penalty reaches the level of punishment, but
that analysis is related to two very different constitutional provisions, the
Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the Excessive Fines
Clause of the Eighth Amendment. If every in rem forfeiture constitutes
"punishment" for constitutional purposes, then it arguably may preclude
the government from bringing separate criminal charges and civil
forfeiture proceedings because Halper prohibits a second sanction that "may
not be fairly be characterized as remedial, but only as a deterrent or
retribution. ,356
What constitutes punishment for determining whether a civil sanction
violates double jeopardy is not necessarily punishment under an application
of the excessive fines prohibition. In Halper, the Court analyzed the purpose
of the civil money penalty and its relation to compensating the government
for the harm caused by the violation in order to reach the conclusion that the
particular sanction reached the level of punishment.3 7 The Court clearly
described the issue as whether "a civil penalty may constitute punishmentfor
the purpose of the Double Jeopardy Clause."35 One of the reasons it undertook
such a broad approach was to protect the "humane interests" embodied by
the double jeopardy protection.35 9 The Court noted that its conclusion was
(6) All moneys, negotiable instruments, securities, or other things of value
furnished or intended to be furnished by any person in exchange for a controlled
substance in violation of this title, all proceeds traceable to such an exchange, and
all moneys, negotiable instruments, and securities used or intended to be used to
facilitate any violation of this title, except that no property shall be forfeited
under this paragraph, to the extent of the interest of an owner, by reason of any
act or omission established by that owner to have been committed or omitted
without the knowledge or consent of that owner.
354. See United States v. Borromeo, 995 F.2d 23, 27 (4th Cir. 1993) (forfeiture of assets acquired
through illegal drug-related activity remedial).
355. Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2810.
356. 490 U.S. at 449.
357. Id. at 449-50.
358. Id. at 446 (emphasis added).
359. Id. at 447.
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for the "rare case," which indicates that punishment has a very specific
meaning under double jeopardy that embodies unique values.360
The analysis of whether a sanction reaches the level of punishment under
the Excessive Fines Clause is just the beginning inquiry, not the conclusion
that it was in Halper. Austin only decided that the Eighth Amendment is
triggered by a civil forfeiture proceeding, and remanded the issue to the
lower courts of whether or not the actual forfeiture traversed the line of
excessiveness.36 There is no constitutional prohibition specifically prohibit-
ing certain types of punishments; the Constitution states only that they be
properly related to the underlying violation. The Eighth Amendment does
not incorporate the same humane interest in protecting people from having
to defend themselves a second time in criminal proceedings, as the Double
Jeopardy Clause does. Austin's reliance on Halper may be misleading because
the Court's goal in Austin was to overcome the argument that the civil label
attached to the proceeding governed whether the Excessive Fines Clause
limited the imposition of the forfeiture. The meaning of punishment under
double jeopardy is not coterminous with punishments that are subject to the
excessive fines prohibition because, before it triggers the protection of the
Double Jeopardy Clause, the sanction must reach a much higher threshold,
based on the factual circumstances of the relation of the sanction to the harm
caused.
F. Halper's Misuse of Proportionality
The application of Halper to civil forfeiture actions could seriously impede
the government's ability to pursue parallel civil and criminal proceedings,
and may force it to choose only one action or make it bring criminal
forfeitures when it intends to indict a claimant to the property.362 Such a
limitation on the government's power might be acceptable if there is a sound
constitutional basis to require a single adjudication of guilt and forfeiture,
but the rationale of the Double Jeopardy Clause cannot reach that far. The
question of whether double jeopardy can apply to civil asset forfeitures
demonstrates the fundamental flaw with the Supreme Court's analysis in
Halper. The core issue in that opinion is the overwhelming disproportionality
360. Id. at 449.
361. Id. at 452.
362. See Cheh, supra note 20, at 1380 (Halper will require better coordination between prosecutors
and regulatory agencies); Eads, supra note 11, at 988 (Halper gives prosecutors little alternative but to
proceed with criminal case first); Khinda, supra note 274, at 154 (Halper and Grady place immense
burden on government to coordinate actions); Glickman, supra note 11, at 1279 (Halper puts pressure
on government to consolidate actions, drop either the civil or criminal action, and avoid double
jeopardy problems in parallel proceedings). But see United States v. Millan, 2 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 1993)
(civil forfeiture suit and criminal case constitute "a single prosecution," thereby eliminating any
Halper problem of multiple punishment).
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between the defendant's criminal gain of $585 and the statutorily required
penalty of $130,000. By making the question of disproportionality a facet of
the constitutional analysis, Halper requires lower courts to make a case-by-
case determination of whether double jeopardy has been violated that is
entirely dependent on the comparison of the penalty assessed with the harm
caused by the violation and the government's costs of investigation. The
question the Court never addressed is whether disproportionality is even a
relevant factor in determining whether a multiple punishment is constitution-
ally permissible. The answer is that it has no role in the analysis, especially
when applied to civil asset forfeitures.
If Halper applies to civil asset forfeitures, the problem with considering
whether a penalty is so disproportionate as to be punitive is that the same
criminal violation, involving identical harms and governmental costs, can
lead to opposite results. If two people are stopped for a traffic violation and
consent to having their cars searched, and a very small amount of cocaine is
discovered in each, with a total value of less than $500, each automobile is
subject to an in rem forfeiture action based on each driver's criminal
conviction for possession of illegal drugs. If one car is a broken-down 1973
Chevrolet Vega, with a value of no more than $300, while the other is a Rolls
Royce with a value of over $100,000, consideration of the disproportionality
of the forfeiture to determine the application of double jeopardy could lead
to the conclusion that the civil action constitutes an impermissible punish-
ment of the Rolls Royce driver, but the forfeiture of the Vega cannot be
described as involving any degree of unfairness. The Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit noted that in the problem with the disproportionality analysis
in forfeiture cases, "[t]he Ferrari is at least as harmful an instrumentality as
the Chevette. 363
The problem with the disproportion ality analysis in asset forfeiture cases is
different from the one the Supreme Court faced in Halper. The filing of false
Medicare claims constitutes both the criminal violation and the basis for the
civil action. The False Claims Act imposed an automatic penalty for each
violation, so the problem with disproportionality is traceable to the assess-
ment of a fixed penalty that may impose a sizeable sanction on the prolific
small-gauge violator. Asset forfeiture, however, reaches the results of the
criminal activity and the instrumentalities of the crime, and is not directed
specifically against the criminal activity itself. Any disproportionality be-
tween the criminal violation and the size of the forfeiture is not a function of
the asset forfeiture statute, but rather the factual circumstance of the
defendant's choice to use a valuable item in connection with a criminal
offense.
363. United States v. Cullen, 979 F.2d at 995.
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Focusing solely on the value of the forfeiture as a rationale for determining
whether double jeopardy applies misconstrues the function of the Double
Jeopardy Clause, and the underlying values it protects. The principle of
verdict finality requires that, when a double jeopardy violation would occur
through the imposition of multiple punishments or successive prosecutions,
there is a complete bar to the additional punishment or proceeding. Double
jeopardy is a categorical prohibition that protects against the misuse of the
criminal process to oppress individuals through repeated trials and unautho-
rized sanctions. 3 64 The Double Jeopardy Clause differs from the other
constitutional criminal protections because it does not permit exceptions to
its coverage or allow for a harmless error analysis.3 65 The Fourth Amend-
ment is subject to a number of exceptions to its requirement that arrests and
searches must be executed pursuant to a warrant,3 66 while evidence admitted
in violation of a defendant's constitutional rights is subject to a harmless
error doctrine.367 The application of double jeopardy is not a fact-specific
exercise that involves balancing whether the defendant's interests are out-
weighed by society's need to exact punishment. Instead, it is a more abstract
analysis to determine the scope of the applicable statutes and the status of
prior adjudications, without reference to whether the penalty exceeds some
vague threshold that permits a court to correct a perceived imbalance.
The only basis on which to judge whether a sanction is proportional to the
underlying violation is under the Excessive Fines Clause. In Austin, Justice
Scalia pointed out that "[t]he question is not how much the confiscated
property is worth, but whether the confiscated property has a close enough
relationship to the offense., 368 The value of the property is not the focus of
the inquiry for in rem forfeitures, but its relationship to the underlying
criminal activity. While there may not be a strict economic comparison of the
crime and the penalty, even the approach suggested by Justice Scalia is not
wholly divorced from considering the value of the property. If there is a close
364. See Thomas, Elegant Theory, supra note 29, at 837 (goal of double jeopardy is to prevent
oppression through multiple uses of criminal process).
365. See Morris v. Mathews, 475 U.S. 237, 248 (1986) (jeopardy-barred conviction reduced to
lesser-included offense not barred by double-jeopardy). The burden is on the defendant to show that
there was a reasonable probability that the jury would not have convicted for the lesser-included
offense. Id. at 247.
366. See 22nd Criminal Procedure Project, supra note 173, at 877 et seq. (detailing the Supreme
Court's "many exceptions to the general rule that an arrest or search must be based on probable cause
and executed pursuant to a warrant to satisfy the Fourth Amendment").
367. See Arizona v. Fulminante, 1It S. Ct. 1246, 1265-66 (1991) (admission of coerced confession
harmless error); Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 684 (1986) (violation of Confrontation Clause
right can be harmless error); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 53 (1970) (admission of evidence
seized in illegal search harmless error); Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 11 (1970) (denial of right to
counsel at preliminary hearing requires determination of whether harmless error).
368. 113 S. Ct. 2801, 2815 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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connection between the underlying criminal activity and the property subject
to forfeiture, then it is less likely that confiscation of even highly valuable
property will rise to the level of excessiveness. The more attenuated the
connection, the more likely a court will judge a forfeiture of valuable items,
especially real estate or businesses, to be a violation of the Eighth Amend-
ment. The very concept of excessiveness requires a degree of comparison
between the crime and the scope of the punishment, so that the Excessive
Fines Clause will require proportionality in the imposition of sanctions.
The Excessive Fines Clause is especially amenable to the proportionality
analysis when monetary penalties are considered in relation to the underly-
ing violation. Consideration of whether a sanction rises to the level of
"excessive" invokes the type of comparative analysis that the Court impru-
dently undertook in Halper. Before Austin, the lower courts, except for the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in 38 Whalers Cove Drive, had been
unwilling to extend the Eighth Amendment's proportionality principle to
civil forfeiture cases, holding that it only applies to criminal actions. 369 For
criminal forfeitures, however, the courts began to recognize that a proportion-
ality analysis is required by the Eighth Amendment.370 InAlexanderv. United
States,37' decided on the same day as Austin, the Court held that criminal in
personam forfeiture actions are also subject to the limitations of the Exces-
sive Fines Clause.372
The rationale for the different treatment was that civil actions were only in
rem proceedings against the property and not a criminal action, which had
369. See United States v. One Parcel of Property Located at 508 Depot Street, 964 F.2d 814, 817
(8th Cir.) (court reluctantly agrees that Eighth Amendment does not apply to civil actions), rev'd sub
nom. Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993); United States v. One Parcel of Real Property,
New Shoreham, RI, 960 F.2d 200, 207 (1st Cir. 1992) ("[Plroportionality analysis is inappropriate in
civil forfeiture cases brought under section 881(a)(7)."); United States v. Real Property and
Residence at 3097 S.W. 11th Ave., 921 F.2d 1551, 1557 (11th Cir. 1991) (proportionality analysis in
criminal forfeitures not applicable to civil forfeitures); United States v. On Leong Chinese Merchant
Association Bldg., 918 F.2d 1289 (7th Cir. 1990) (courts have uniformly held that Eighth Amendment
does not apply to in rem actions because they are remedial); United States v. One 107.9 Acre Parcel of
Land Located in Warren Township, 898 F.2d 396, 401 (3d Cir. 1990) (application of civil forfeiture
provision to real property does not violate Eighth Amendment); United States v. Tax Lot 1500, 861
F.2d 232, 234 (9th Cir. 1988) (constitution hardly requires proportionality review of civil forfeitures if
it permits in rem forfeiture of innocent owner's property); cf. United States v. Premises Known as 318
South Third Street, 988 F.2d 822, 828-29 (8th Cir. 1993) (proportionality review permitted of civil
forfeitures under gambling statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1955, because forfeiture is permissive, not mandatory,
and therefore district court need not order forfeiture if disproportionate to underlying violation).
370. See United States v. Sarbello, 985 F.2d 716, 724 (3d Cir. 1993) (proportionality analysis
required when defendant makes prima facie showing that forfeiture is grossly disproportionate to
seriousness of the offense); United States v. Busher, 817 F.2d 1409, 1414 (9th Cir. 1987) (because
RICO forfeiture provision is without limitation, it may exceed constitutional bounds and requires
proportionality analysis).
371. 113 S. Ct. 2766 (1993).
372. Id. at 2775-76.
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been considered the limit of the Eighth Amendment's coverage. Such an
analysis, when coupled with Halper's proportionality feature, created a
potentially anomalous structure. Criminal forfeitures were subject to propor-
tionality review under the Eighth Amendment, and civil forfeitures may be
subject to Halper proportionality if there is a parallel criminal proceeding
that will trigger double jeopardy protection. A civil forfeiture, standing alone,
would not be subject to any constitutional limitation, no matter the value of
the seized property or its relation to the underlying violation, because it
cannot meet the prerequisites for the Double Jeopardy Clause, a prior
prosecution, or the presumed outer limit of the Eighth Amendment: a
criminal prosecution. Austin resolves that anomaly by permitting consider-
ation of the Excessive Fines Clause whenever the sanction may involve
punishment, regardless of the procedural label applied to the action.
The problem now, however, is that Halper still permits some defendants to
use the proportionality principle embodied in the Eighth Amendment, but
the effect is much greater than that allowed under that constitutional
provision. A double jeopardy violation may prohibit a second proceeding
involving offenses that incorporate the same elements or are a species of
lesser included offense, which could preclude the government from bringing
a criminal action if the civil sanction was imposed first. An Eighth Amend-
ment violation, on the other hand, only prohibits the disproportionate aspect
of the punishment, because a court can only impose a sanction that is
commensurate with the violation. The issue of what constitutes punishment
requires different treatment when the claim involves a possible violation of
double jeopardy than when the issue is whether the sanction rises to the level
of excessiveness. The better approach to limiting the government's power to
inflict punishments that exceed the acceptable threshold is through the
Eighth Amendment rather than the Double Jeopardy Clause.
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has made the Double Jeopardy Clause the Sargasso
Sea it bemoaned over a decade ago because its decisions do not reflect any
clear consideration of how its shifting rationales for preventing or permitting
successive actions affect other types of cases. For a constitutional provision
that results in the prohibition of a prosecution, rather than some lesser
remedy, the Court should strive for a measure of consistency in its analysis
rather than announcing rules that appear broad but are ostensibly limited to
the "rare case."
Grady and Halper were the result of the Supreme Court's attempt to
announce principled decisions in cases in which sympathetic facts called out
for a result that the theory of the Double Jeopardy Clause and the Court's
precedents should not permit. Those decisions especially show the Court
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operating in a vacuum that does not consider the effect of a decision on other
forms of government enforcement activity.
Grady's same conduct test could have expanded double jeopardy to
require, in most instances, that the government bring all of its actions in a
single proceeding. The Court first rejected such a broad approach in Felix,
but it could not bring itself to overrule Grady. The next term, it put Grady to
rest in Dixon, but did little to clarify the scope of the Blockburger test by
applying it both broadly and narrowly in the same decision. The Court's effort
to accommodate competing analyses of the same elements test creates
confusion rather than certainty, which conflicts with the principal value of
verdict finality embodied in the Double Jeopardy Clause.
Halper's proportionality principle is better suited to an Eighth Amendment
analysis rather than an extension of double jeopardy beyond criminal cases
to cover punishments that exceed some vague threshold. Halper fits best
with fixed-penalty statutes that require imposition of heavy sanctions for
what may be an isolated incident or innocuous series of violations. Much
like the Supreme Court in Felix limited Grady to a particular type of case,
Halper's peculiar application of the multiple punishment analysis to a succes-
sive prosecution should be confined to a limited set of circumstances that
avoids any broad application of the proportionality principle to the Double
Jeopardy Clause. The key to limiting Halper rests in distinguishing the
meaning of punishment for double jeopardy purposes and the prohibition on
excessive fines. In the former, punishment is the conclusion of an analysis
that is designed to protect specific values embodied in the Double Jeopardy
Clause, while for the latter constitutional protection, virtually any sanction
may be considered punishment because that is only the beginning of the
analysis of whether a sanction is too severe to pass constitutional muster.
Halper is an example of how the procedural posture of a case is a crucial
element in determining the scope of double jeopardy's protection. The Court
ignored the status of the parallel proceedings as raising successive prosecu-
tion concerns, which led it to adopt a rule that it was forced to assert was only
for the "rare case." A fact-specific analysis whose application can only be
defined vaguely by statements of what the rule does not cover misinterprets
the scope of the Double Jeopardy Clause. Defendants and prosecutors need
certainty above all else in decisions about double jeopardy because the
consequences of a constitutional violation can be so great. The weakness of
the confused analysis in Grady, Dixon, and Halper is that they demonstrate
that the Court cannot bring itself to adopt bright-line rules that permit
relatively sound judgments about the government's power to seek sanctions.
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